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The most heartrending deprivation of all is the inequality of status
that excludes people from full membership in the community, de-
grading them by labeling them as outsiders, denying them their very
selves.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Felon exclusion laws2 are jurisdiction-specific, post-conviction
statutory restrictions that prohibit convicted felons from exercising
a host of legal rights, most notably the right to vote.3  The pro-
fessed intent of these laws is to punish convicted felons equally
without regard for the demographic characteristics of each individ-
ual, including race, class, or gender.4  Felon exclusion laws, how-
ever, have a disproportionate impact on African-American males
and, by extension, on the residential communities from which
many convicted felons come.  Thus, felon exclusion laws not only
1. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 4 (1989).
2. This Article uses the phrase “felon exclusion laws” because it represents the
interdisciplinary approach undertaken in the analysis.  Felons are not just denied
rights, but are excluded from full membership in society.  Other scholars have used
“criminal disenfranchisement” to refer to the disenfranchisement of offenders.  Alex
C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement
Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1045-46; see generally Debra Parkes,
Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws,
13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71 (2003) (discussing the abolishment of voting
restrictions for incarcerated offenders).  Some scholars use the term “felon disen-
franchisement.” See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Foundering Democracy: Felony Disen-
franchisement in the American Tradition of Voter Exclusion, 19 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 32
(2005).  Still others refer to the range of laws that deprive convicted felons of rights as
“collateral sentencing consequences,” Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile:
The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 153, 153 (1999), or “collateral consequences of a felony conviction,” Ke-
vin G. Buckler & Lawrence F. Travis, III, Reanalyzing the Prevalence and Social Con-
text of Collateral Consequence Statutes, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 435, 436 (2003); Kathleen M.
Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study
of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10 (1996).
3. For national survey data of state statutes with regard to felon exclusion laws,
such as the prohibitions and the status of the convicted felon, see generally Velmer S.
Burton, Jr. et al., Reducing the Legal Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A Na-
tional Survey of State Statutes, 12 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 101 (1998);
see also generally Buckler & Travis, supra note 2; Olivares et al., supra note 2.
4. “That long history refutes any suggestion that felon disenfranchisement provi-
sions are racially motivated.  Their antebellum origins show that they were aimed at
whites and were maintained for race-neutral reasons: before the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the states were free to, and the vast majority did, impose
direct and express racial qualifications on the franchise.”  Roger Clegg et al., The
Bullet and The Ballot? The Case for Felon Disenfranchisement Statutes, 14 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 6 (2006), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/jour-
nal/genderlaw/14/clegg1.pdf?rd=1.
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relegate African-American convicted felons to a position of sec-
ond-class citizenship, but the laws also diminish the collective citi-
zenship5 of many African-American communities.
Upon conviction of a felony, generally defined as “a serious
crime . . . punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or
death,”6 the individual becomes a member of the convicted felon
status group.  While all persons convicted of a felony are members
of this status group,7 not all convicted felons have the same rela-
tionship to the criminal justice system, thus I have created the fol-
lowing typology to characterize those relationships.  The convicted
felon status group can be divided into the following two catego-
ries—felons and ex-felons—where the status of the former is predi-
cated on some type of control and the latter is not.  Specifically,
felons have not satisfied the requirements associated with their
sentences and thus remain under the auspices of the criminal jus-
tice system.  The felon category can be further divided into those
persons that are incarcerated,8 on probation,9 or on parole.10  By
contrast, ex-felons have completed their entire sentences, and are
no longer under the direction and control of the criminal justice
system.
5. In this context, the term “collective citizenship” refers to the process of en-
dowing citizenship rights to an entire group.  For example, Puerto Ricans were
granted the rights of citizenship in the early Twentieth century as a single entity.  Jose´
A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, Notes on the Legislative History
of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 457 (1978).
Similarly, African-Americans were granted the rights of citizenship with the passage
of the Reconstruction Amendments; as were women, who became fully incorporated
as a group with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.  Reva B. Siegel, She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115
HARV. L. REV. 947, 951 (2002).
6. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (7th ed. 1999).
7. Convicted felons are a defined community of individuals that cross lines of
race, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status.  Weber notes that “status groups
are normally communities . . . [of] an amorphous kind . . . .  Both propertied and
propertyless [sic] people can belong to the same status group, and frequently they do
with very tangible consequences.”  Max Weber, Class, Status and Party, in CLASS,
STATUS AND POWER: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 24
(Reinhard Bendix & Seymour Martin Lipset eds., 2d ed. 1966).
8. Incarcerated felons are individuals that are housed either in a secure facility,
such as a jail, a prison, or a penitentiary, or in a community facility, where they must
return every evening. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 760.
9. Probation is “a court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to stated condi-
tions, releases a convicted person into the community instead of sending the criminal
to jail or prison.” Id. at 1220.
10. Parole is “the release of a prisoner from imprisonment before the full sentence
has been served.” Id. at 1139.
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Membership in the convicted felon status group comes with
many disabilities, not least of which is the infringement upon the
right to vote.  A felony conviction, however, can also be used to
deny additional rights or serve as a basis to terminate existing rela-
tionships.11  For example, depending upon the jurisdiction, a con-
victed felon can be prohibited from serving on a jury, obtaining
public employment, holding public office, or owning a firearm.12
Moreover, a felony conviction can be cited as a reason to terminate
a convicted felon’s marriage or parental rights, and can require a
convicted felon to register with local law enforcement officials.13
Felon exclusion laws undermine a convicted felon’s full citizenship.
Within the convicted felon status group, ex-felons possess the
strongest legal and moral claim for having their rights restored au-
tomatically upon the completion of their sentences.14
Felon exclusion laws have a long and complex history in Ameri-
can jurisprudence.15  Consequently, scholars disagree as to whether
such laws were passed following Reconstruction to purposefully
deny the vote to the newly freed African-Americans, or were con-
tinuing a longstanding practice of disenfranchisement, political or
otherwise.16  While the contention that felon exclusion laws did not
11. Olivares et al., supra note 2, at 11.  Specific jurisdictional statutes will be
presented and discussed in Part III. See infra notes 84-90.
12. Olivares et al., supra note 2, at 12-13.
13. Id.
14. This Article focuses specifically on the ex-felon group because ex-felons have
completed their sentences and paid their debt to society.  In other words, the ex-
felons to which this Article refers have been unconditionally released from the direc-
tion and control of the criminal justice system.  While this Article also contends that
convicted felons who are either on probation or parole should not be denied their
citizenship rights, that argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
15. For a discussion of the historical origins of felon disenfranchisement in the
United States see generally KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISE-
MENT IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND MODERN
CONSEQUENCES (2005) and Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Men-
ace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559 (2003).
16. “In the wake of Reconstruction and suffrage for adult black males, many
states amended their felon disenfranchisement laws with the specific purpose of
targeting ‘black crimes,’ so as to reduce the number of eligible black voters.”  Elkan
Abramowitz, Felon Disenfranchisement v. Uniform Standards in Federal Elections,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2, 2001, at 3. But cf. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 330 (2000) (noting that
disenfranchisement laws did not exist solely to deny African-Americans the right to
vote, but that “[t]he disfranchisement of felons has a long and complex history, begin-
ning in some states well before the Civil War and interwoven, in the South, with late
nineteenth and twentieth-century efforts to keep African-Americans from voting”);
Clegg et al., supra note 4 at 6.
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have a racial basis is in part valid, there is ample evidence to the
contrary demonstrating that laws were designed specifically to di-
minish the power of the African-American community, either by
limiting its members’ right to vote,17 thereby making African-
Americans voiceless, or by increasing the obstacles to reentry fol-
lowing a conviction and possibly incarceration.18  For instance,
some jurisdictions changed the status of many offenses to felonies
so that felon exclusion laws were broad and vague enough to allow
newly freed African-Americans to be convicted of a felony.19  In
doing so, African-Americans were denied the opportunity to be
full citizens.  In many jurisdictions, the right to vote was restricted
or outright denied more often than any other right because it
served not only as a symbol of membership, and thus a marker of
full citizenship, but also because it provided African-Americans
with the means to effectuate legal and social change and thus ac-
quire additional rights.20  While this Article agrees that the right to
vote is both symbolically and practically important, it contends that
whenever a citizen is denied any right that is guaranteed to all
other members of society, the citizen from whom that right is with-
held is denied full citizenship.
17. Christopher Uggen et al., Felony Voting Rights and the Disenfranchisement of
African-Americans, 5 SOULS 48, 49-50 (2003).
18. “Reentry” is a legal term of art used to describe the process by which individu-
als that have been convicted, and more often than not incarcerated, transition back
into society.   Demleitner, supra note 2, at 156-58; see also JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT
THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY 257
(2005).
19. [S]ome states enumerated ‘new’ crimes . . . that triggered disenfranchise-
ment.  These included (in the case of Alabama, 1901) such offenses as ‘em-
bezzlement, larceny, receiving stolen property, obtaining money or property
under false pretences, assault and battery on the wife, bigamy, miscegena-
tion, crime against nature or crime involving moral turpitude; also any per-
son convicted as a vagrant or tramp, or election fraud.’  Georgia’s (1877)
constitution included a ‘moral turpitude’ disenfranchising clause, and South
Carolina’s included ‘bigamy, wife beating, housebreaking, receiving stolen
goods, breach of trust with fraudulent intent, fornication, sodomy, assault
with intent to ravish, miscegenation, larceny or any offense against election
laws.’
PETTUS, supra note 15, at 35; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 16, at 162.
20. Parkes, supra note 2, at 88.  “While there was an important symbolic effect of
including previously disenfranchised individuals in the electorate, the push for voting
rights for African Americans was not merely a symbolic matter . . . .” Id.  Under the
“Black Electoral Success Theory” put forth by Lani Guinier, “three reasons were ar-
ticulated for political participation: (1) to mobilize the African American community;
(2) to promote a social and economic agenda; and (3) to elect responsive officials.”
Id.
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The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that felon exclusion
laws are not race neutral and that the application of the laws has a
racially discriminatory effect, and to call for their abolition.  The
laws contribute to the erosion of citizenship rights for the individ-
ual African-American ex-felon, and the undermining of the collec-
tive citizenship rights of the larger African-American community.
Part II discusses the conceptualization of citizenship that under-
scores the premise of the Article.  Part III discusses the exclusions
that ex-felons encounter and the resulting impact on the individual
and the community.  Using Alabama as a case study, Part IV
presents the operation of felon exclusion laws in a specific jurisdic-
tion.  Finally, Part V proposes that felon exclusion laws should be
abolished because they deny full citizenship to the individual ex-
felon and undermine the collective citizenship of the ex-felons’ res-
idential communities.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship is defined as the status of being a citizen,21 where the
citizen has become a member of a particular political community
through a delineated process, owes allegiance to that community,
and in return is afforded certain rights and privileges.22  This literal
definition fails to capture fully the complexity inherent in the con-
cept itself.
Citizenship as a concept has a variety of meanings.23  It is used to
discuss the procedural requirements of how an individual becomes
a citizen of a polity, i.e. the process of citizenship.  It also refers to
what is expected of an individual upon becoming a citizen, i.e. the
practice of citizenship.  Yet, citizenship is far too complex a concept
21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 237.
22. PETTUS, supra note 15, at 19 (discussing classical theories of citizenship).
23. According to Bosniak, the Roman model of citizenship produced two concep-
tualizations—citizenship as a matter of formal legal standing, i.e. “to be a citizen is to
possess the legal status of citizenship,” and citizenship as “entitlement to, and enjoy-
ment of, rights.” LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CON-
TEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 19 (2006). In addition, T.H. Marshall, a British sociologist,
posited a “tripartite structure of civil, political, and social rights.” T.H. MARSHALL,
CLASS CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 78-79 (1964).  Furthermore, there is
also a conception of citizenship guided by “civic republican theory which contempo-
rary scholars use to denote[ ] the process of democratic self-government, deliberative
democracy, and the practice of active engagement in the life of the political commu-
nity.” Id. For the purposes of discussion, I use Marshall’s tripartite structure as re-
fined by Talcott Parsons, an American sociologist, to discuss how felon exclusion laws
deny ex-felons full citizenship and diminish the collective citizenship of their residen-
tial communities. See generally TALCOTT PARSONS, THE NEGRO AMERICAN (Talcott
Parsons & Kenneth B. Clark eds., 1965).
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to be reduced to either the “status of being a citizen”24 or the prac-
tices in which a citizen engages.  Rather than engage in a pro-
tracted discussion of the many facets of citizenship, which would be
beyond the scope of the Article, I will briefly discuss the process,
the practice, and the parts of citizenship, infra, and the latter will
serve as the framework for the analysis of how felon exclusion laws
undermine not only the individual citizenship of African-American
ex-felons, but also the collective citizenship of the communities of
which these ex-felons are members.25
A. The Process of Citizenship
In the United States, an individual is endowed with the status of
citizen through two processes—by birth26 or by naturalization.27
Citizenship endowed by birth is manifested under two distinct but
related doctrines—jus sanguinis28 and jus soli.29  Under the former,
“[i]f you were born outside of the United States, you are still con-
sidered a citizen at birth if at least one of your parents was a
[United States] citizen when you were born.”30  Under the latter
doctrine, “[i]f you were born in the United States, including Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, you are a citizen at birth
. . . .”31  Regardless of the doctrine under which the status is ob-
tained, the individual is granted citizenship not because of an af-
firmative choice or decision, but solely through the accident of
birth.  Under this formulation, citizenship is a passive process
whose status is bestowed upon the individual as a result of biologi-
cal identity.  By contrast, citizenship obtained through naturaliza-
tion is an affirmative, proactive process whereby the person
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 237.
25. A discussion of the undermining of collective community citizenship could
easily address other groups, including Hispanics and poor whites; however, the analy-
sis in this Article is restricted to African-Americans because of the overt historical
practice of denying them citizenship.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006).  “Most individuals who are citizens at birth are either
born in the United States or its territories, or are born to parents who were U.S.
citizens.” MARGARET C. JASPER, BECOMING A CITIZEN 7 (2005).
27. “Naturalization is the process by which U.S. citizenship is conferred upon a
foreign citizen or national after he or she fulfills the requirements established by Con-
gress in the Immigration and Nationality Act.” JASPER, supra note 26, at 15.
28. Jus sanguinis is “right of blood” and stands for the proposition that “a child’s
citizenship is determined by the parents’ citizenship.  Most nations follow this rule.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 868.
29. Jus soli is the “right of the soil” and stands for the proposition that “a child’s
citizenship is determined by place of birth.” Id.
30. JASPER, supra note 26, at 12.
31. Id.
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seeking to become a citizen must not only satisfy specific statutory
requirements before being endowed with the full set of rights at-
tendant to that status, but the individual is also required to perform
certain duties as well.32
While the doctrines identify two distinct paths to citizenship, the
practical result remains the same—legal recognition on the part of
the polity that an individual has satisfied the requisite qualifica-
tions of membership.  Conceived in this manner, citizenship can be
viewed simply as a process, passive for some and active for others.
Yet, anyone who satisfies the statutory criteria will be recognized
as an official member of the polity entitled to the same rights and
privileges33 enjoyed by the other members of the polity.  Citizen-
ship as a process, therefore, is a reductionist view whereby the sat-
isfaction of statutorily proscribed criteria endows a person with the
legal status of citizenship.  This conceptualization of citizenship as a
process fails to account adequately for the nuances inherent in the
concept of citizenship.  While citizenship is a legally defined pro-
cess in which a person who satisfies the necessary criteria is re-
warded with the status of citizen, it also requires potential and
current citizens to perform affirmative duties either to qualify for
or retain rights associated with the status.
B. The Practice of Citizenship
To become a citizen and “enjoy all [the] civil rights and protec-
tions”34 that come with that status, a person must fulfill certain ob-
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1445 (2006); JASPER, supra note 26, at 15-16.
If [an individual] wants to become a U.S. citizen, [the individual] must be at
least 18 years old before [the individual] can apply for naturalization.  In
addition, the following eligibility requirements must be met: 1. A period of
continuous residence and physical presence in the United States; 2. Resi-
dence in a particular USCIS [United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services] District prior to filing; 3. An ability to read, write, and speak En-
glish; 4. A knowledge and understanding of Civics – i.e., U.S. History and
Government; 5. Good moral character; 6. Attachment to the principles of
the U.S. Constitution; and 7. Favorable disposition to the United States.  All
applicants must demonstrate the last three . . . requirements . . . .  The rest of
the naturalization requirements  . . . may be modified or waived for certain
applicants, such as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a spouse of a U.S.
citizen.
Id.
33. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 237.
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ligations, foremost being “allegiance to the community.”35  In this
way, citizenship can be conceived as a process of exchange where
the individual is required to perform affirmative duties in exchange
for a specified set of benefits.  In most contexts, especially Ameri-
can society, those benefits are realized in the form of rights.  By
agreeing to perform the affirmative duties of a particular political
community, the individual tacitly agrees to comply with the estab-
lished rules and regulations of that community.  Consequently, the
individual’s compliance with the rules of the community requires
the individual to surrender some personal freedom.
Citizenship thus conceived is contractarian, and the individual
enters into a “social contract” where “[e]ach one of us puts into the
community his person and all his powers under the supreme direc-
tion of the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every mem-
ber as an indivisible part of the whole.”36  In other words, the
individual readily submits to the dictates of the polity and is no
longer viewed as separate from the polity, but as a part of the
larger community.  In theory, any person who fulfills the requisite
obligations set forth by the political community can receive the
benefits associated with that community.  Ultimately, therefore,
citizenship can be equated with membership in a community.
What underlies that membership is the concept of equality.
At the core of American citizenship lies the concept of equality,
as exemplified in the Declaration of Independence.  With the sim-
ple phrase “[a]ll men are created equal,”37 the founding fathers ac-
knowledged that no one man was more important than any other.
35. Id.
36. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 61 (1968). According to
Rousseau, when individuals associate, they form an independent body that has its
own life, and each member is individually referred to as a citizen:
Immediately, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, this
act of association creates an artificial and collective body composed of as
many members as there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that
body acquires its unity, its common ego, its life and its will.  The public per-
son thus formed by the union of all other persons was once called the city,
and is now known as the republic or the body politic.  In its passive role it is
called the state, when it plays an active role it is the sovereign; and when it is
compared to others of its own kind, it is a power.  Those who are associated
in it take collectively the name of a people, and call themselves individually
citizens, in so far as they share in the sovereign power, and subjects, in so far
as they and put themselves under the laws of the state.
Id. at 61-62.
37. “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed, by their creator, with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE pmbl (U.S. 1776).
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Yet that simple phrase also indicates whom the founding fathers
considered to be equal—while the phrase does not explicitly spec-
ify, at that time “all men” meant all propertied white men.38  To-
day, the exclusion of women, African-Americans, and other groups
from American society is not sanctioned.  No one person in con-
temporary American society is considered more important than
any other—it is that notion of equality that forms the basis of
American citizenship.
In the United States . . . [equality] seems to mean common citi-
zenship.  Americans seem to feel equal when they possess a
bundle of rights and obligations that they view as normal for
their society.  Citizenship does encompass certain minimal rights
to income and employment . . . .  Equality is not so much an
entitlement, a status, as an activity.  To be equal an American
must do things, not just claim them.  From that perspective du-
ties such as obeying the law or paying taxes become, not just
burdens, but badges of belonging.39
With the performance of affirmative duties, a person is consid-
ered equal to every other person, sharing in the “common citizen-
ship,”40 and deemed worthy of the status of citizen.
Some legal scholars argue that the right to vote is a fundamental
right, and as such it is central to the meaning of citizenship.41  Fur-
thermore, the fundamental importance of the right to vote is not
determined by its actual exercise, but merely by its possession.42
Possessing the right to vote is of paramount importance as it is a
tool by which an individual engages in active participation—“[t]he
right to vote serves as the embodiment of political empowerment,
and it is essential to the full privilege of effective citizenship.”43
The right to vote, therefore, can be construed not only as a means
38. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorff, Levels of Generality in the Definition
of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1099  (with the phrase “‘all men,’ the Continental
Congress meant only propertied men, or only free men, or only white men, or only
free white men with property”).
39. LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP 238-39 (1986).
40. Id. at 239.
41. “The ability to exercise the franchise lies at the very root of citizenship . . . .”
Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on the Black Vote:
The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1994).
42. The right to vote has significant symbolic and practical importance for previ-
ously disenfranchised groups in the United States, including women and people of
color. See Eric Foner, From Slavery to Citizenship: Blacks and the Right to Vote, in
VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF
VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 55, 55-65 (Donald W. Rogers ed. 1990).
43. Harvey, supra note 41, at 1189.
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for an individual to exercise political power, but also as a necessary
requirement in being a full citizen.
Although the right to vote is undeniably important in defining
citizenship, it is not the sole determinant of what it means to be a
citizen.  The possession of the right to vote, or more aptly the op-
portunity to participate in the political process, serves as an indica-
tor of a person’s legal status as a member of the polity, but nothing
more.44  Conversely, the loss or infringement of that right would
indicate both a repudiation of membership in the polity and a lack
of full citizenship.  This Article contends that because the right to
vote is a political right that allows an individual to be an active
participant in the government and is exercised cyclically, it is not
the determining factor of citizenship.  Citizenship in fact embodies
a full range of rights including, but not limited to, the possession or
exercise of the right to vote.
C. The Parts of Citizenship
The deprivations that ex-felons encounter extend beyond the
scope of the political sphere.  The right to vote is integral to a citi-
zen’s sense of belonging and undeniably holds a place of critical
importance in the United States for both its symbolic and practical
value; it serves as a marker of inclusion for formerly excluded
groups, i.e., African-Americans, women, and those under the age
of eighteen.45  For ex-felons the right to vote is merely one of many
rights denied to them in but one of several spheres of their lives.
44. The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
granted the right to vote to all. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The unimpeded exer-
cise of that right, however, was not realized by African-American voters until the
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that protected them from tactics of disen-
franchisement such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and outright violence, which were em-
ployed to bar them their right.  42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
45. For African-Americans, the right to vote was granted in 1870 with the Fif-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“[t]he right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”), U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1, but not realized and legally protected until 1965 and thereafter.  42
U.S.C. § 1973.  For women, the right to vote was officially recognized in 1920 with the
Nineteenth Amendment (“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex”), U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX, following a vigorous universal suffrage movement.  The move-
ment was necessary because the enfranchisement granted in the Fifteenth Amend-
ment specifically addressed race but not gender. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
Additionally, the right to vote also serves as a marker for eighteen year olds to be
fully included in the polity. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1  (“The right of citizens of
the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any state on account of age.”).
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Convicted felons are denied a host of rights that govern the social
and legal spheres of their life; many of these rights have more
pressing importance than the opportunity to cast a ballot.  To ex-
amine how felon exclusion laws infringe upon the full citizenship of
both the individual ex-felon and the community to which the ex-
felon belongs, a multi-part conceptualization of citizenship will be
used.  The leading contemporary scholar to consider such a multi-
part conceptualization of citizenship is T.H. Marshall, a British
sociologist; and, it is Marshall’s formulation of citizenship that
frames this Article.
Marshall posited that citizenship is comprised of three distinct,
yet interdependent, elements: the civil,46 meaning individual free-
dom; the political, referring to the franchise; and the social, ad-
dressing an individual’s economic life.47  The political element,
according to Marshall, consists of the “right to participate in the
exercise of political power.”48  This element is comprised not only
of the right to vote, but also includes the right to pursue public
office; political power is manifested in the voice of the people and
through the machinations of those chosen to serve as proxies of the
people.  The rights most commonly associated with the civil ele-
ment are those rights that are “necessary for individual freedom,”49
and in the context of the United States are embodied in the Bill of
Rights.50
46. Talcott Parsons, an American sociologist, changed the civil element to a legal
element to reflect more accurately the uniquely American context of citizenship.
“The civil (which in an American reference should perhaps be called legal), the politi-
cal, concerned particularly with the democratic franchise, and the social, which refers
essentially to the context we defined as ‘welfare’ or, in the terms of our federal organ-
ization, health, education, and welfare.” PARSONS, supra note 23, at 716.  For the
scope of this Article, however, Marshall’s civil element of citizenship will be used.
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual free-
dom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right
to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice . . . .
This shows us that the institutions most directly associated with civil rights
are the courts of justice.  By the political element I mean the right to partici-
pate in the exercise of political power. . . .  By the social element I mean the
whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to
the right to share the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being
according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most
closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services.
MARSHALL, supra note 23, at 71-72 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 72.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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The social element provides that a citizen not only has a right to
earn a living, but also to enjoy all of the intangible rights associated
with being a member of that particular society—those intangibles
allow an individual to take part in the social heritage of the soci-
ety.51  Unlike the political or civil elements, the rights associated
with the social element are not explicitly set forth in the United
States Constitution, but are reflected in the founding documents of
the United States, whereby each person has a right to pursue hap-
piness.52  Furthermore, the practical expression of Marshall’s state-
ment that every citizen has a “right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security”53 and “the right to share the full social heri-
tage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the stan-
dards prevailing in the society”54 is realized, in part, in the social
welfare system; the stated purpose and goals of which are to pro-
vide assistance to citizens and to prevent them from falling below a
minimum standard of living.55
In accord with Marshall’s conceptualization, citizenship is com-
prised of more than the right to vote.  Citizenship means that a
person who has obtained the status of a citizen is equal to all other
members of society and is not only endowed with, but also entitled
to, all of the rights associated with each of citizenship’s three ele-
ments.  By extension, the denial or the infringement of any right
associated with one of those elements constitutes an erosion of that
person’s full citizenship.
III. IMPACT OF FELON EXCLUSION LAWS
All fifty-one United States jurisdictions have felon exclusion
laws, with the substance of these laws differing by jurisdiction.
When ex-felons have followed the rules set forth by the criminal
justice system after committing a crime, including, but not limited
to, serving a sentence, and these ex-felons’ rights are not restored
automatically following release from that system, they are denied
full citizenship.  Moreover, the deprivation of citizenship to the in-
dividual ex-felon has the collateral impact of infringing upon the
51. Marshall, supra note 23, at 72.
52. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S 1776).
53. Marshall, supra note 23, at 72.
54. Id.
55. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscio-
nability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract, 24
J. LEG. STUD. 283, 301 (1995) (“The purpose of the welfare system is not so much to
raise the utility of the poor as to establish a minimum welfare level.”).
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collective citizenship of the residential community of which the ex-
felon is a member.
A. The Exclusion Laws
Any statutory proscription that either impedes an ex-felon’s ex-
ercise of the vote, renders an ex-felon ineligible for jury service,
denies an ex-felon an opportunity to obtain public employment, or
disqualifies an ex-felon from holding public office is an infringe-
ment upon that ex-felon’s full citizenship.  No one right is more
important than any other when defining the status of being a
citizen.
i. Denying the Vote
A convicted felon is deprived of the right to vote in some man-
ner in approximately forty-seven jurisdictions in the United
States.56  Jurisdictional differences relating to the deprivation of
the right to vote become readily apparent when one considers the
specific conditions for the loss of the right or the “rights restora-
tion” process.57  For instance, twenty-one jurisdictions deprive a
person of the right to vote following a conviction only if that per-
son is incarcerated,58 but thirteen of those twenty-one restore the
56. The jurisdictions include all fifty states and the District of Columbia.  Of the
four that give a convicted felon the right to vote, Maine and Vermont do so for all
offenses, Alabama for offenses not “involving moral turpitude,” and Mississippi for
offenses not constitutionally specified. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF
FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-
STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 85 (2006).
57. The “rights restoration” process refers to the jurisdictional procedures to
which convicted felons must follow to have their civil rights returned.
58. See Appendix I; see also LOVE, supra note 56, at 85.  “In most of these jurisdic-
tions the vote is lost only if the person is actually incarcerated, and not if the prison
term is suspended.  However, persons sentenced to prison in Idaho, Louisiana, and
South Dakota lose the right to vote even if the prison portion of the sentence is sus-
pended . . . .” LOVE supra note 56, at 85 n.53.  All tables relating to the deprivations
that ex-felons face are drawn from LOVE, supra note 56, and OFFICE OF THE PARDON
ATTORNEY, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY
(1996).
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right to vote upon release,59 and seven upon completion of the
sentence.60
An additional twenty-one jurisdictions, absent any overlap with
the first group, deprive a convicted felon of the right to vote solely
upon conviction.61  Some require that the convicted felon be a first
time offender62 and others restore the right to vote depending on
the type of offense.63  Although the majority of jurisdictions deny
the right to vote when a convicted felon is serving a sentence, there
are several jurisdictions that have either waiting periods or discre-
tionary restoration policies which impact the deprivation of the
right to vote.64
Discretionary restoration policies often entail a combination of
waiting periods following the unconditional discharge from a sen-
tence and an application either to the Board of Pardon and Parole
or the governor.  Some jurisdictions have discretionary policies for
all convicted felons.  For instance, in Florida, convicted felons are
59. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6; D.C. CODE §§ 1-225, 1-241(c), 1-1302(7)(A) (2007); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 831-2(a)(1) (2006); IND. CODE § 3-7-13-4(a) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 51, § 1 (West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2(I)(a), (b) (2006); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-33-01 to -03 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (West
2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.281 (2005); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2602(w), 3146.1
(West 2006). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-705 (2006) (except for federal and out-
of-state offenders); see also LOVE, supra note 56, at 135-39; OFFICE OF THE PARDON
ATTORNEY, supra note 58.
60. See Appendix I.
61. See Appendix II.
62. Some jurisdictions deny the right to vote until the full discharge of the sen-
tence for first time offenders. ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 2, MD. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV.
CONST. art. 2, § 1; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-904(A)(1)-(4), 16-101(5) (2006); MD.
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 8-207(b)(1) (West 2006).
63. Some jurisdictions deny the right to vote until full discharge based upon the
type of offense. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-120(B)(3) (2006);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-20-112, 2-19-143 (2006) (amended by S. 860, 104th Assem.
(Tenn. 2006)); 94 Op. Att’y Gen. 222 (1984).
Under Tennessee’s new law, all former felons can bypass the court and com-
plete a certificate of restoration at county election commission offices.  The
bill, however, expanded the range of felonies that permanently disen-
franchise anyone with the exception of certain offenses.  It also requires the
formerly incarcerated to be current on child support payments and pay fi-
nancial restitution—an area of contention for some reform groups.
OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, supra note 58.
64. DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2, § 7 (five years except for certain serious offenses);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-112, § 29-113 (2006) (two years); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-
106(a) (2006) (five years for non-violent first offenders only).  Maryland requires an
additional three-year waiting period for recidivists. MD.  CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-
102 (b)(1)(ii).
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denied the right to vote until an application to the Clemency Board
is submitted.65  Kentucky and Virginia also place the onus on the
convicted felon; while the former requires an application to the
governor, the latter mandates an additional waiting period in order
for a convicted felon to become eligible to apply to the governor
for restoration.66  Other jurisdictions, however, have discretionary
policies for only certain convicted felons.  For instance, in Ala-
bama, a crime of moral turpitude will lead to the loss of the right to
vote, but the right can be restored upon successful application to
the Pardon Board.67  In Mississippi, convicted felons are required
to wait an additional period of seven years following the comple-
tion of their sentence and then must apply to the governor for res-
toration of the right to vote.68  Regardless of the manner in which it
is manifested, the deprivation of the right to vote denies a con-
victed felon full citizenship because it infringes the political ele-
ment of citizenship.  In addition to disenfranchisement, the
deprivation of the opportunity to hold public office is another in-
fringement on the political element of citizenship.
ii. Barred from Serving in a Representative Capacity
Felon exclusion laws deprive convicted felons of the opportunity
to seek public office, and also to retain public office if the felony
conviction occurred while in office.  For the majority of jurisdic-
tions that use a felony conviction to bar convicted felons from serv-
ing in a representative capacity, the disqualification is based upon
the type of offense that was committed.69  Most jurisdictions deny
convicted felons from retaining or seeking public office because
they committed an offense that was a violation of trust, such as
bribery, perjury, or embezzlement.  Other jurisdictions require that
for a convicted felon to be eligible to seek office, that person must
first have had other rights restored.  For example, in Georgia, a
person convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude “loses the
right to hold any civil office, ‘unless restored to all his rights of
citizenship by a pardon from the State Board of Pardons and Pa-
65. LOVE, supra note 56, at 26-27.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Appendix III.
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roles.’”70  As such, an ex-felon must wait ten years following his
unconditional discharge to be eligible to seek public office.71
Apart from offense disqualification or ineligibility due to not
having other rights restored, convicted felons that are in office dur-
ing the commission of the felony are statutorily prohibited from
retaining that office.  Thus, in some states, a felony conviction that
occurs while in office constitutes a forfeiture of that office.72
iii. Striking Potential Jurors
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution grants
an individual the right to trial by an impartial jury as quickly as is
judicially feasible.73  Nowhere does that right explicitly or implicitly
state that an individual has a constitutional right to serve on a jury.
If, however, a distinct segment of the population is permanently
barred from serving as a juror then the impartiality of the jury sys-
tem is suspect.  In thirty jurisdictions, convicted felons are perma-
nently barred from serving on a jury.74  Of the remaining twenty-
one jurisdictions, seven deny convicted felons the opportunity to
be jurors until they have been unconditionally discharged,75 and
four require convicted felons to wait an additional period of time,
ranging from one to ten years, before their eligibility for jury ser-
vice is restored.76  Not all jurisdictions, however, disqualify a con-
victed felon outright from jury service.
In some jurisdictions, convicted felons are permitted to be mem-
bers of the jury pool and are allowed to be disqualified during the
voir dire process.  For instance, Iowa allows convicted felons to be
challenged for cause.77  Other jurisdictions restrict jury service to
70. GA. CONST. art. II, §§ II, III.2; GA. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1(3) (2006); see also
Appendix IV.
71. GA. CONST. art. II, §§ II, III.2; GA. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1(3).
72. See Appendix V.
73. “The right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
74. See Appendix VI.
75. MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.241 (2006) (“No person
convicted of a felony may serve on a jury until his unconditional discharge.”); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 305/2 (2006); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(A)(5) (2006) (the
right to serve on a jury is not restored unless the person is pardoned); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.1307a(1)(e) (2006); MINN. STAT. § 609.165, subdiv. 1 (2006); WASH. REV.
CODE § 2.36.070(5) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 756.02 (2006); see State v. Baxter, 357 So. 2d
271, 275 (La. Ct. App. 1978); 49 Op. Att’y Gen. 134 (1980).
76. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46(a), (b) (2007); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1906(b)(2)(B)
(LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4615(1), (2) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-
19 (2006).
77. IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.915(6); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.18(5).
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felons convicted only in their jurisdiction and summarily restore
the right to serve on a jury upon release from confinement.78  By
contrast, Colorado, Maine, and New Hampshire have no law re-
stricting convicted felons from jury service.79
The denial of convicted felons, and more specifically ex-felons,
from jury service infringes Marshall’s civil element of citizenship
because of the direct impact on the institutions commonly associ-
ated with that element, the courts of justice.80  Withholding the
right to serve on a jury denies convicted felons the exercise of a
civic duty and thus denies an opportunity for such individuals to
participate and therefore be full citizens.  In addition to being de-
nied the opportunity to exercise a civil element right, convicted
felons are statutorily restricted in the employment and occupa-
tional licensing opportunities available to them thereby impacting
the social element of citizenship.
iv. Public and Private Employment and Occupational
Licensing Restrictions
A majority of jurisdictions statutorily regulate the extent to
which a convicted felon can be denied either public employment,
private employment, or a license based solely upon their convic-
tion.81  For many jurisdictions convicted felons can be denied em-
ployment, either public or private, or occupational licensing
provided that there is a nexus between the occupation and the na-
ture of the offense.82  For example, even the four jurisdictions with
the most “comprehensive laws prohibiting discrimination on
grounds of conviction”83 still allow such grounds to be used to deny
the employment opportunities of convicted felons if a relationship
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-08(2)(e) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.281 (2005);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 962(a)(5), tit. 12, § 64 (2006).
79. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105(3) (2006) (“Eligibility for jury service is not lost
by conviction, since the disqualification statute was repealed in 1989.”); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1152(4) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2(I)(a), (b)
(2006) (“No disqualification from jury service is imposed upon conviction.”).
80. MARSHALL, supra note 23, at 78.
81. “Thirty-three states have enacted a generally applicable law purporting to reg-
ulate the extent to which public employers and/or licensing authorities can consider
conviction in connection with deciding whether to hire or whether to terminate em-
ployment.” LOVE, supra note 56, at 64.
82. “[A] full two-thirds of the states have enacted general laws regulating consid-
eration of a felony conviction in connection with employment and/or licensure, re-
quiring that such a conviction be ‘reasonably related’ (or ‘directly’ or ‘substantially’
related) to the particular occupation or profession before termination or refusal to
hire is permitted.” Id. at 63-64.
83. Id. at 68-71.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ301.txt unknown Seq: 19 20-SEP-07 10:46
2007] UNDERMINING CITIZENSHIP 851
exists between the employment or licensing sought and the nature
of the conviction.84  While other jurisdictions operate similarly,
each differs with respect to the type of employment, public or pri-
vate, that convicted felons are disqualified from holding or the type
of licensing that is withheld.
In the absence of a relationship between occupation type and the
nature of the conviction, a number of jurisdictions do not deny
convicted felons the opportunity to secure public employment and
occupational licensing.85  These same jurisdictions, however, do not
restrict the potential for denial in the area of private employ-
ment.86  On the other hand, jurisdictions such as Kansas and Mas-
84. In Hawaii, with certain exceptions, a person may not be denied public employ-
ment, or an occupational or professional license, solely by reason of a prior conviction
of a crime. HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-3.1(a), (d) (2006).  Hiring and licensing entities
may consider a conviction as a possible justification for refusal, suspension, or revoca-
tion of employment or a license when the offense directly relates to possible perform-
ance in the job and it is determined that “the person so convicted has not been
sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant the public trust.” Id. § 831-3.1(b).
In New York, a professional or occupational license may be denied, revoked, or
suspended because of a conviction.  N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 126(1) (1-a) (Mc-
Kinney 2007) (trafficking in alcoholic beverages); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(4) (Mc-
Kinney 2007) (attorney).
In Pennsylvania, employers may consider felony and misdemeanor convictions only
to the extent they relate to the applicant’s suitability for employment in that position.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9125(b) (2006).  A professional or occupational license may be
denied, suspended, or revoked because of conviction of a felony or misdemeanor re-
lated to the occupation. Id. § 9124(c).  Occupations in which conviction of certain
crimes may affect licensure include: architect, 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 34.19(a)(8) (2006)
(felony or crime of moral turpitude); psychologist, id. § 1208(a)(6) (federal or state
felony or equivalent foreign crime, or misdemeanor involving psychology); pharma-
cist, id. § 390-5(a)(2) (felony, offense involving moral turpitude, or offense in connec-
tion with the practice of pharmacy); and social worker, id. § 1911(a)(1) (felony or
crime of moral turpitude).
In Wisconsin, no state employer, private employer, or licensing agency may deny or
terminate employment or a license because of a person’s conviction record unless the
circumstances of the offense substantially relate to the particular position, or the con-
viction would preclude obtaining a required bond. WIS. STAT. §§ 111.321, 111.322,
111.32(6), 11.335(c) (2005).  For example, a person engaged in the business of install-
ing burglar alarms may not employ a convicted felon as an installer of burglar alarms
unless the felon has received a pardon. Id. §§ 111.335(1)(cm), 134.59(1).  Further, a
person’s license or permit relating to alcoholic beverages may be revoked, suspended,
or not renewed based solely on his conviction for certain drug offenses under Id.
§ 161.41,  or under federal law or the law of another state that is substantially similar.
Id. §§ 111.335(1)(cs), 125.04(5)(1), (5)(b).  Effective July 1, 1997, convicted felons who
have not been pardoned are ineligible to be licensed as private detectives or private
security persons. Id. § 440.26(2)(c)(1).  Other fields in which a conviction may be rele-
vant in the licensing decision include medical practices, id. § 448.05(1)(a), and optom-
etry, id. § 449.07(1)(d).
85. See Appendix VII; see also LOVE, supra note 56, at 71-76.
86. LOVE, supra note 56, at 71-76.
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sachusetts choose to limit public and private employers’ inquiry
into a conviction, but do not place any such restrictions on occupa-
tional licensing authorities;87  even these jurisdictions exempt clas-
ses of occupations from using a felony conviction as grounds for
denying employment.88  Still others restrict the disqualification of
convicted felons with regard to “occupational licensure but not em-
ployment.”89  Finally, several jurisdictions allow a felony conviction
to be used to deny licensing for specified occupations.90
While many jurisdictions regulate the potential disqualification
from public or private employment and occupational licensing that
convicted felons encounter as a result of their convictions, ex-
felons are still readily excluded from a vast number of employment
opportunities.  Consequently, convicted felons are statutorily pre-
cluded from making economic choices that directly impact their
well-being and collaterally impact their communities.
B. Impact of the Exclusions on the Individual
All convicted felons, as members of the convicted felon status
group, should occupy a similar position not only within the criminal
justice system but also upon release from the system.  Felon exclu-
sion laws therefore should impact all persons convicted of a felony
equally.  Nothing could be further from reality.  With the lack of
uniformity across jurisdictions and between the federal and state
system, convicted felons encounter a variety of disabilities depend-
ing upon the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred.  In addi-
tion to the differential impact across jurisdictions or in specific
87. In Kansas, a licensing board may consider an applicant’s felony conviction, but
the conviction is not an absolute bar to licensure.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-120 (2005).
A felony conviction may result in suspension or revocation of a license. Id. § 65-
2836(c) (healing arts), § 65-1120(a)(2) (nursing), § 65-1627(a)(2), (c) (pharmacy),
§ 74-5324(a) (psychology), § 1-311(a)(9) (accounting).
In Massachusetts, certain convictions may be considered by a licensing authority in
deciding whether to grant, suspend, or revoke an occupational or professional license.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 5 (medicine), ch. 112, § 52D (dentistry), ch. 112,
§ 60A, 60G (architecture), ch. 112, § 128 (psychology), ch. 112, § 55 (veterinary
medicine) (West 2004). See also LOVE, supra note 56, at 76-77.
88. In Massachusetts, no person who has been convicted of a felony may be ap-
pointed as a peace officer, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 96A, and no person who
has been convicted of a felony or convicted of a misdemeanor for which she was
confined in any jail or house of correction is eligible to be a state correctional officer,
unless, in the case of lower-ranking employees, the commissioner of the department
of correction certifies that the appointment will contribute substantially to the work
of the department. Id. ch. 125, § 9.  No convicted felon may be appointed as an in-
spector of the Department of Public Safety. Id. ch. 22, § 6A.
89. See Appendix VIII; see also LOVE, supra note 56, at 77-82.
90. See Appendix IX.
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regions of the United States, felon exclusion laws also have a dis-
proportionate impact across other demographic categories, such as
race and socioeconomic status.  More specifically, felon exclusion
laws disproportionately impact African-American convicted felons
because of their representation in the felon status group relative to
their presence in the general population of the United States.91  To
illustrate the impact of felon exclusion laws on the African-Ameri-
can community, voting registration and the lack thereof will be
used as a proxy for exclusions within the community with respect
to voting and the other disabilities that convicted felons encounter.
According to the 2000 Census, the population of the United
States totaled 281,421,906.92  African-Americans comprise
35,658,190 members of the total population, or approximately 12.3
percent.  By comparison, there are a total of 211,460,626 who iden-
tify as whites only, or approximately 75.1 percent; Hispanics or La-
tinos (of any race) comprise 35,305,818, or approximately 12.5
percent of the population.93  The population data indicates that
there are six times more whites (single race only) than African-
Americans in the total general population.  Therefore, the impact
of any practice or policy will be more profound for the group
whose population is smaller relative to the larger group.  The im-
91. The statistical methodology reflected in this section was presented originally
using 1990 Census data.
The 1990 Census reported that 29,986,060 of a total 248,709,873 Americans
are black, compared to 199,686,070 white citizens.  Blacks account for
roughly 12.1% of the total U.S. population, compared to the 80.3% white
population . . . .  [T]he black voting age population which, in 1998, was esti-
mated to be 9,171,000, or approximately 4% of the current total population.
Of that number of eligible black voters, 5,842,000 blacks, or 63.7 were regis-
tered to vote.
Harvey, supra note 41, at 1150-51.  In this Article, the methodology is similarly ap-
plied with 2000 data.
92. The 2000 census data is used instead of the later estimates of 2004 because the
relevant data on registration of voters and convictions of felonies is for 2002, thus
making a comparison between the two inexact. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000,
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dp1/2kh00.pdf [hereinafter CENSUS
DEMOGRAPHICS 2000].
93. The percent total for African-Americans, Whites, and Hispanics equals 99.9
percent.  “Because Hispanics may be of any race, data in this report for Hispanics
overlap slightly with data for the Black population and for the Asian and Pacific Is-
lander population.  Based on the November 2000 Current Population Survey, 2 per-
cent of the Black population 18 and older and 1 percent of the Asian and Pacific
Islander population 18 and older were of Hispanic origin.” BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NO-
VEMBER 2002, at 3 n.6, http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf [hereinafter
VOTING AND REGISTRATION].
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pact is even more profound when the pool of individuals is de-
creased further.
The United States voting population is bounded not only by age
restrictions, but also by citizenship.  Thus, the relevant population
under consideration is all persons at least eighteen years old, and
citizens of the United States.94  In the year 2000, that number was
209,128,094.95  Of that number, there were 129,549,000 individuals
that were not only eligible to vote but also registered to vote, and
110,826,000, or approximately 69.5 percent, reported actually exer-
cising the right.96  Within the African-American population, the to-
tal number of eligible citizens was 22,753,000, with 15,348,000
registered to vote.  Of the latter number, there were 12,917,000, or
67.5 percent, that reported actually voting.97  By reference, the rel-
evant figures for the eligible white, non-Hispanic, voting popula-
tion was 144,732,000, of which 103,588,000 were registered and
89,469,000, or 71.6 percent that actually voted.98  Comparatively,
there are six times more eligible non-Hispanic whites than African-
Americans that are able to cast a ballot.99  Thus, any practice that
affects the ability to either register or cast a ballot will have a
greater impact on the African-American community; that becomes
readily apparent when the number of African-American males
convicted of a felony is considered.
In the United States, men over the age of eighteen are forty-
eight percent of the total general population, but comprise approx-
imately eighty-three percent of the convicted felon population.100
While non-Hispanic whites were seventy-nine percent of the gen-
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States,
who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any state on account of age.”).
95. CENSUS DEMOGRAPHICS 2000, supra note 92, at 3.
96. Id.
97. For Hispanics of any race, the figures are: total eligible 13,158,000; total regis-
tered 7,546,000, with 5,934,000 reporting voted or 57.3. Id.
98. Id. at 3.
99. In no way does this Article assert that all non-Hispanic whites or African-
Americans vote the same way.  The use of the voting and registration data is used to
demonstrate that with such a population advantage in the non-Hispanic white com-
munity, the impact of felon exclusion laws may not be felt to the same extent as in the
smaller African-American community.  It is important to note, however, that if the
communities were divided along other demographic categories, such as socioeco-
nomic status, communities of low socioeconomic non-Hispanic whites would be dis-
proportionately impacted relative to their position with other members in the non-
Hispanic white category.
100. MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2000 (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf.
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eral population, they only accounted for fifty-four percent of the
felony convictions.101  On the other hand, African-Americans were
only twelve percent of the general population, but were forty-four
percent of the convicted felon population.102  In other words, of the
estimated 924,700 felony convictions in state court, African-Ameri-
cans accounted for 410,100 of the convictions.103  Approximately
two percent of the eligible African-American voting population
was disenfranchised as a consequence of a felony conviction occur-
ring in the year 2000.  While two percent of the African-American
community encounters the prospect of disenfranchisement in a sin-
gle calendar year, the cumulative effect is much greater.  Accord-
ing to Uggen and Manza, as well as others, the number of
disenfranchised citizens in the African-American community is
seven percent, compared to only 2.3 percent in the general popula-
tion.104  Others have noted that African-Americans are disen-
franchised at a rate of seven times that of the national average.105
With each passing year, the conviction and incarceration rate of
African-American males continues to increase106 and the denial of
101. Id.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics does not disaggregate the groups according
to age groups. Id.
102. Id.
103. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SEN-
TENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS (2000), tbl. 2.1, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ab-
stract/scscts.htm.
104. “4.6 million ex-felons are disenfranchised,” and within the African-American
community, which comprises less than thirteen percent of the total United States pop-
ulation, supra note 91, more than seven percent of the population is barred from
voting due to felony convictions; while in the general population that comprises more
than eighty-five percent of the total United States population, supra note 91, only “2.3
percent” are restricted from voting.  Uggen et al., supra note 17, at 52.  According to
Human Rights Watch, “3.9 million adults, or 2% of the population, are disen-
franchised at present; but among black men the figure is 1.3 million, or 13%.”  Human
Rights Watch, Disenfranchised for Life, THE ECONOMIST, Oct 24, 1998 at 30 [herein-
after Human Rights Watch, Disenfranchised for Life]; see also Lani Guinier, What We
Must Overcome, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Mar. 12, 2001, at 26, available at http://
www.prospect.org/print/V12/5/guinier-l.html; Gillian Metzger, Cruel and All Too
Usual, NAT’L L.J., June 28, 1999, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/stack_de-
tail.asp?key=96&subkey=6696.
105. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE:
THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 8
(1998), http://www.sentencingproject.org/tmp/File/FVR/fd_losingthevote.pdf.
106. We are incarcerating African-American men at a rate of approximately
four times the rate of incarceration of black men in South Africa under
apartheid . . . .  The number of black men, in prison (792,000) has already
equaled the number of men enslaved in 1820 . . . .  If current trends continue,
only 15 years remain before the United States incarcerates as many African-
American men as were forced into chattel bondage at slavery’s peak, in
1860.
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their full citizenship continues to proliferate.  Accepting the data
that seven percent of the African-American population is disen-
franchised means that a significant portion of the African-Ameri-
can community is not only deprived of the opportunity to cast a
ballot but also denied the opportunity to seek public office, serve
on a jury, or secure gainful employment.  The cumulative effect of
these disabilities not only undermines the individual convicted
felon’s citizenship status but also denies collective citizenship to the
community.
C. Impact on the African-American Community
Felon exclusion laws deny the individual convicted felon rights
and privileges and the aggregation of those affected individuals in
specific communities directly impacts the political power, economic
viability, and social stability of the larger communities to which
they belong.  In other words, communities with a large number of
convicted felons have a significant disadvantage with respect to
other communities because many of the members are excluded
from participation in the political, civil, and social spheres of com-
munity life.  The significance of the individual exclusions for such
communities is highlighted in a study of two Florida communities.
Todd Clear, a criminal justice professor, conducted an extensive
study of two poor and mostly black communities in Tallahassee,
Florida, and found that there was “not a single family without at
least one disenfranchised man.”107  Extrapolating from these two
communities, the extent of the problem is pervasive and, equally as
important, concentrated.  The concentration of ex-felons in a par-
ticular community will impact that community along each of the
Marshall elements,108 thereby undermining the collective citizen-
ship of the community.
Graham Boyd, The Drug War is the New Jim Crow, NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAS,
July-Aug. 2001, at 18, available at http://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/racialjustice/10830
pub20010731.html.  In the same vein, Human Rights Watch predicts that thirty to
forty percent of the next generation of African-American could be permanently dis-
enfranchised if present trends continue.  Human Rights Watch, Disenfranchised for
Life, supra note 104 at 30.
107. Nicholas Thompson, Locking Up the Vote: Former Prisoners Barred From Vot-
ing Under Florida Law, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 2001, at 17.
108. See PARSONS, supra note 23, at 716.
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i. Silencing the Collective Voice and Diminishing
Representative Choice
When individual ex-felons are denied the right to vote, commu-
nities lack the collective ability to alter the outcome of legislation
and to choose representatives sensitive to the community’s needs.
With a disproportionate representation of convicted felons in a
community, for example the Tallahassee, Florida communities, it is
“unlikely that the community will be able to band together
when . . . a state senator proposes locating a toxic waste dump
nearby.”109  The community’s ability to resist negative proposals is
severely hampered, thereby leaving the community at the mercy of
an otherwise disengaged and external majority.  Moreover, disen-
franchisement precludes the community from electing those per-
sons that may serve as representatives of their collective interests.
When a significant segment of the community is denied the op-
portunity to participate in the political process, communities are
subsequently denied the opportunity to vote individuals or parties
into office that are favorably disposed to the needs and desires of
the community.  “The political implications of disenfranchisement
can be significant . . . .  Because most felons are likely to be poor
and members of racial minority groups . . . ‘disenfranchisement
laws tend to take votes away from Democratic candidates.’”110
The importance of a community having a representative that is re-
sponsive to its needs and that can represent the community’s inter-
ests in legislative bodies is highlighted in the numerous redistricting
and ballot access cases.111  It has long been recognized that the
power to vote is without force if a majority can consistently over-
ride the wishes of a substantial minority.112  Hence, the loss of com-
munity voting power prohibits the community from having an
effective voice in the political sphere, and the collective voice of
the people is effectively silenced.  Not only do the deprivations im-
pact the political element of citizenship from the community’s per-
spective, but they also adversely impact other areas, such as the
criminal justice system.
109. Thompson, supra note 107, at 17.
110. Somini Sengupta, Felony Costs Voting Rights for a Lifetime in 9 States, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at A18, A28.
111. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Tashjian v. Republican Party
of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
112. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (1971).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ301.txt unknown Seq: 26 20-SEP-07 10:46
858 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
ii. A Priori Jury Pool Bias
Prior to the venire or seating of a jury, felon exclusion laws oper-
ate to disqualify from jury service a disproportionate number of
individuals from lower socioeconomic groups and from racial mi-
norities.  Consequently, members of those groups who are on trial
face the distinct possibility of having a non-representative pool of
jurors from which to select a jury of their peers.113  While there
may be a compelling argument for denying probationers and parol-
ees from jury service because of their conditional release status, ex-
felons should be allowed to sit on a jury because they have success-
fully fulfilled the citizenship duties associated with their
conviction.114
The a priori exclusion of ex-felons from jury service has a dispro-
portionate impact on African-American, lower socioeconomic sta-
tus defendants.115  Although the United States Supreme Court has
stated that proportional representation is not necessary to create a
fair jury,116 the lack of peers in a potential pool of jurors creates an
unfair bias not only for the defendant of the same racial group but
also for other defendants; moreover, no quantity of protection dur-
ing the voir dire process can alleviate that inequality.  With the in-
creasing number of African-American males convicted of felonies,
the issue is not proportional representation, but the lack of a viable
pool from which to draw jury members who are demographically
similar across a variety of characteristics, such as gender, educa-
tion, and class.
113. “It remains clear, however, that the constitutional right to be tried by a jury of
one’s peers provides ‘an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.’”  Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 29 (1999) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)); see
also Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 572 (1976) (“The right to a fair
trial by a jury of one’s peers is unquestionably one of the most precious and sacred
safeguards enshrined in the Bill of Rights.”).
114. One of the often overlooked affirmative duties of citizenship is adhering to the
procedures of the criminal justice system.  Therefore, the individual that is convicted
of a crime and subsequently serves her sentence is entitled to have her rights automat-
ically restored.  The ex-felon may have transgressed the laws and thus failed to per-
form the positive affirmative duty of refraining from breaking the law, but by
completing the sentence and being released from the criminal justice system, the indi-
vidual has fulfilled another affirmative duty of citizenship.  12 FED. SENT. R. 248.
115. Harvey, supra note 41, at 1156.
116. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (“Indeed, it would be impossible to
apply a concept of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the hetero-
geneous nature of our society.”).
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The rights of an individual accused of a crime are protected by
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.117  Convicted
felons should not have a right to sit on a jury simply because they
are members of a class of persons that is not represented in the jury
trial.  They should be allowed to sit on a jury because the felon
exclusion laws have a disproportionate impact on a class of persons
that is protected, namely African-Americans.  Furthermore, ex-
felons have served their full sentences and thus their full citizen-
ship should be returned—this can only be effectuated by the auto-
matic restoration of all of their civil rights.
iii. No Employment, No Capital—Social or Financial
Families must financially support unemployed ex-felons without
the aid of public assistance, which is usually denied to those who
have been convicted of a felony.118  Moreover, the lack of viable
employment for ex-felons limits social networking for other mem-
bers of the community.  In other words, potential job opportunities
based upon connections and contacts are lost because the social
networks built through employment are drastically reduced.119  In
addition to reducing the social networking opportunities for the
community members, the lack of employment adversely impacts
the self-esteem of ex-felons and, by extension, increases the likeli-
hood of recidivism.120
IV. “SWEET HOME ALABAMA,”121 BUT NOT FOR EX-FELONS
Historically, Alabama stands as a reminder that African-Ameri-
can civil rights were not easily granted.  Vivid images of the civil
rights struggle in Alabama are forever etched in the country’s col-
lective conscience: Birmingham Sheriff “Bull” Connor setting po-
lice dogs and turning fire hoses on nonviolent demonstrators and
117. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also supra note 73.
118. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, The Consequences of Transfer, in
THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO
THE CRIMINAL COURT 227, 260 (Jeffery Fagan & Franklin Zimring eds., 2000); see
also LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY 12 (2004),
available at http://www.lac.org/lac/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf.
119. See Dina Rose & Todd Clear, INCARCERATION, REENTRY AND SOCIAL CAPI-
TAL: SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE BALANCE, at 187, available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/410623_SocialCapital.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
120. Id. at 194.
121. LYNRD SKYNRD, Sweet Home Alabama, on SECOND HELPING (Sanctuary
Records 1974).
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the removal of four little girls’ bodies from the Sixteenth Street
Baptist Church.122  Alabama stands as a model for how the acquisi-
tion of full citizenship status for African-Americans was denied at
every turn.  Alabama’s entrenched policies of denying citizenship
to African-Americans still stand strong today.  Even in the absence
of Bull Connor and the overt influence of the Ku Klux Klan, the
Alabama legislature has circumvented the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and in-
fringed upon the citizenship status of African-Americans in many
ways.  For example, upon a felony conviction, Alabama bars: (1)
the right to vote; (2) the right to hold public employment; (3) the
right to serve as a juror; and, (4) the right to hold office.123  Moreo-
ver, Alabama allows a felony conviction to be used as grounds for
the termination of parental rights and the granting of a divorce; it
also requires ex-felons to register in their local communities.124
With respect to disenfranchisement, in Alabama and Florida
one-third of all African-American men, most of them ex-offenders,
have lost their right to vote.125  Many of the provisions in the state
constitution of Alabama parallel the U.S. Constitution.  The Ala-
bama constitution of 1868 outlines the processes to gain state citi-
zenship, and they are the same as the federal government—birth or
naturalization.126  When Alabama amended its constitution in 1901
(“the 1901 constitution”), the legislature added several sections
that discuss citizenship rights, foremost among them the prohibi-
tion of slavery and the protection of the right to vote.  Article I,
Section thirty of the 1901 constitution states that “no citizen shall
be exiled.”127  In Section thirty-two of the same article, the consti-
tution states that “no form of slavery shall exist in this state; and
there shall not be any involuntary servitude, otherwise than for the
punishment of crime, of which the party shall have been duly con-
victed.”128  Section thirty-three addresses the right to vote: “[t]he
122. MARY BETH NORTON, ET AL., A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 622-24 (1996).
123. Olivares et al., supra note 2, at 13.  The restoration of the right to vote can be
obtained with a pardon or a certificate of eligibility from the Board of Pardons and
Paroles. ALA. CODE § 17-3-31 (1975).
124. Id. at 12-13.
125. Human Rights Watch, Disenfranchised for Life, supra note 104, at 30.
126. “That all persons resident in this state, born in the United States, or natural-
ized, or who shall have legally declared their intention to become citizens of the
United States, hereby declared citizens of the State of Alabama, possessing equal civil
and political rights.” ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 2.
127. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 30.
128. Id. art. I, § 32.
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privilege of suffrage shall be protected by laws regulating elections
and prohibiting, under adequate penalties, all undue influences
from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper conduct.”129  In
many ways, the state constitution of Alabama does not differ from
the U.S. Constitution.
In subsequent articles to the 1901 constitution, the State outlined
the restrictions that could bar an Alabama citizen from certain ac-
tivities.  In Article IV, for example, the constitution identifies
which citizenship rights are restricted when a citizen is convicted of
a felony.  Section sixty outlines the felonies that prohibit a citizen
from holding public office.130  In Amendment 579(b), Alabama sets
forth the conditions that restrict a citizen’s right to vote.  “No per-
son convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, or who is men-
tally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil
and political rights or removal of disability.”131  Other felon exclu-
sion laws appear in Alabama’s criminal code and focus on criminal
registration.132
For ex-felons who must submit to criminal registration in Ala-
bama, the constitutional provision focuses on the issue of resi-
dence.  An ex-felon who has been convicted of two or more
felonies is required to register with authorities if present in the
state for a period exceeding twenty-four hours.133  In addition, Ala-
bama requires the registered felon to possess and carry a registra-
tion card, and present the card for inspection upon demand by any
law enforcement agent.134  This requirement evokes images not of
129. Id. art. I, § 33.
130. “No person convicted of embezzlement of the public money, bribery, perjury,
or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to the legislature, or capable of holding any
office of trust or profit in this state.” Id. art. IV, § 60.
131. Id. art. VIII, amend. 579 (repealed and reenacted 1996).
132. Olivares et al., supra note 2 at 18.
133. It shall be the duty of any person who has been convicted more than twice
of a felony under the laws of any state or the United States, who has not
been restored to his civil rights by competent legal authority . . . to register
within 24 hours after his arrival in the county, in a book of registration . . .
under the supervision of the sheriff.
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-181 (1975).
134. [T]he sheriff or one of his deputies shall give to such person a registration
card, showing the name of such person, his address in the county and the
date of registration . . . .  It shall be unlawful for anyone who is required to
register under the provision of this article to be within any county in the
state without having in his immediate possession a registration card . . . .  It
shall be the duty of such person to carry the card with him at all times while
he is within the county and to exhibit the same to any officer of a municipal-
ity, a county or the state upon request.
Id. § 13A-11-182.
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the United States, but of South Africa under apartheid.  The State
of Alabama exacerbates the stigma of being an ex-felon by placing
additional prohibitions on the ex-felons; they are branded with a
symbolic scarlet letter and must display it upon request.
Consider Arthur Sabree’s story.  Sabree, age fifty-six, is a one-
time cocaine dealer of considerable influence who has been out of
prison for ten years and off parole for two years.135  Mr. Sabree is
now a spiritual leader at the Shining Light for Lost Souls Ministry,
sells t-shirts on the street, serves as the captain of his neighborhood
watch group, and owns the home where he lives with his wife of ten
years.136  As he is a convicted felon, Alabama law bars Mr. Sabree
from voting for the rest of his life: “I work every day, I pay taxes,
[and] I am now the leader in the spiritual community teaching
other people to obey.  Voting is a right.”137
Alabama is a jurisdiction with a difficult process for ex-felons to
regain their rights.138  Alabama denies the right to vote from any-
one with a felony conviction and only a pardon from state officials
will restore this right,139 and such an application may require a
DNA test and notification to the crime victim.140  Therefore, upon
completion of one’s sentence in Alabama, the submission of a
DNA test is necessary in order to be able to exercise the right to
vote, as well as to exercise other deprived rights.  The State finds
this process to be reasonable.141  Regardless of the indisputable
fact that the prison time assigned to the crime has been completed,
there are extralegal barriers to regaining citizenship in Alabama.
Consequently, the denial of citizenship in that state will continue to
persist and continue to disproportionately impact African-
Americans.
135. Sengupta, supra note 110, at A28.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Civil rights lost as a result of a felony conviction may be regained only through
a pardon; the state’s pardoning power is generally vested in the Board of Pardons and
Paroles. ALA. CONST. amend. 38; ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.  A state pardon does not
relieve civil and political disabilities unless “specifically expressed in the pardon.”
ALA. CODE § 15-22-36(c).
139. ALA. CONST. amend. 38; ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.
140. Persons convicted of a felony or certain other offenses involving danger to
other persons must submit to the taking of a DNA sample as a mandatory condition
of pardon. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25(f).
141. Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor states that the restoration of the voting
rights process “ensures that voting privileges are accorded to the deserving.  ‘I think it
would be a mistake to restore automatically all voting rights for all defendants with-
out regard to whether they’ve accepted responsibility, expressed remorse and paid
restitution to the victim.’”  Sengupta, supra note 110, at A18.
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V. AUTOMATIC RESTORATION OF RIGHTS FOR EX-FELONS
By depriving convicted felons of the rights and privileges granted
to all other citizens, convicted felons are denied full citizenship and
reduced to a position of second-class citizenship.  The proposition
that there are differing levels of citizenship has long been settled,142
and a deprivation of a fundamental right for one group of citizens
and not another violates the Equal Protection Clause.143  A con-
victed felon that is denied certain statutorily proscribed rights is
not simply relegated to a secondary status of citizenship, but is for
all intents and purposes denaturalized.  The Supreme Court held
that denaturalization without due process is a violation of that per-
son’s rights.144  The remedy proposed for the infringement of a
convicted felon’s citizenship through the deprivation of rights is the
automatic restoration of those rights following unconditional dis-
charge, absent the following exception.  For convicted felons that
remain under the auspice and control of the criminal justice sys-
tem, automatic restoration of rights is a rebuttable presumption
whereby the State bears the burden of demonstrating that there is
a compelling interest to restrict the restoration of a right.  In sum,
the remedy provided for in this Article is the automatic and un-
qualified restoration of rights for ex-felons and the automatic res-
toration for all other categories of felons with the onus on the State
to demonstrate that a limitation on restoration is rationally related
to a compelling interest.145
A. Exclusion Laws Violate the Fourteenth Amendment
Following the completion of their sentences, ex-felons are un-
conditionally discharged from the criminal justice system and thus
no longer owe a debt to society.  Felon exclusion laws inhibit the
citizen ex-felon from successfully re-entering society as an equal.
The subsequent inequality to which ex-felons are subjected appears
to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.146  Appearances,
142. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
144. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 124 (1957) (“Divestment of citizenship by the
Government has been characterized, in the context of denaturalization, as ‘more seri-
ous than a taking of one’s property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty.’”).
145. This Article will focus on the former proposal, the automatic and unqualified
restoration of rights to ex-felons.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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however, are not legal conclusions, and thus ex-felons have had
difficulty prevailing on that and other constitutional bases.147
To prevail under an equal protection claim, an ex-felon would
have to demonstrate the existence of a discriminatory purpose and
discriminatory intent, and that the group was arbitrarily chosen as
the target.148  Although African-Americans are disproportionately
represented in the convicted felon status group, and by extension
in the ex-felon category, it would be difficult to demonstrate that
the purpose and intent of the felon exclusion laws were aimed at
disenfranchising individual African-American males or the collec-
tive African-American community, hence the lack of constitutional
success.  Consequently, an equal protection challenge would not be
successful to assert a basis for the automatic restoration of rights to
ex-felons.  Ex-felons may have a greater opportunity of success in
looking for a legislative enactment to restore their rights similar to
the manner in which the Voting Rights Act149 was used to ensure
that African-Americans as a whole would not be disenfranchised.
B. Legislative Action Needed for Automatic Restoration
of Ex-Felon’s Rights
In Richardson v. Ramirez,150 the Supreme Court declared that
states may generally deprive offenders of the right to vote without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
More than a decade after Ramirez, the Court held that an Ala-
bama law that disenfranchised certain offenders was invalid be-
cause its application lacked uniformity, disproportionately
impacted minorities, and there was discriminatory intent that ac-
companied its passage.151  Thus, the court invalidated the law not
because it impacted citizenship, but because it was an overt dis-
147. See Ewald, supra note 2, at 1047 (citing Elizabeth Du Fresne & William Du
Fresne, The Case for Allowing “Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for Judges”: Beyond Green
v. Board of Elections of New York City, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 112 (1969)); Howard
Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right to Vote: Back-
ground and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721 (1972); Gary L. Reback, Note,
Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment,  25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 846 (1973);
Note, The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on the States’ Power to Disen-
franchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 297, 297 (1967); Douglas
R. Tims, Comment, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Cruelly Excessive Pun-
ishment, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 124, 127 (1975).
148. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
149. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
150. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).
151. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225 (1985) (affirming that the district
court appropriately found discrimination and that “Section 182 would not have been
enacted in absence of the racially discriminatory motivation.”).
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criminatory action on the part of Alabama legislators to deny the
right to vote to African-Americans.152  The Court barred the impo-
sition of restrictive voting laws for ex-felons, but only insofar as
there was a discriminatory purpose and intent on the part of the
legislators.  In the absence of recourse in the judiciary, State legis-
latures need to address the discriminatory effect that felon exclu-
sion laws have on ex-felons as a whole, and the disproportionate
impact that the laws have on African-American male ex-felons and
their communities.
Following the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, Afri-
can-Americans were constitutionally granted citizenship and en-
dowed with the right to vote.  Moreover, the right to vote was
protected from infringement from other jurisdictions.153  Yet, a
host of disenfranchisement techniques were used to deprive Afri-
can-Americans of their constitutionally guaranteed right to vote,
including literacy tests,  poll taxes, whites only primaries, and
grandfather clauses.154  While judicial action was not wholly suc-
cessful in overcoming the obstacles that effectively disenfranchised
African-Americans, Congress did manage to address disen-
franchisement with the passage of the Voting Rights Act.155
As a group, ex-felons face wholesale disenfranchisement similar
to that experienced primarily by African-Americans after the pas-
sage of the Reconstruction Amendments.  For ex-felons, however,
the impact exceeds the denial of the right to vote and encompasses
a host of additional disabilities that lack a nexus to the offense
committed.  “Most felon disenfranchisement laws apply to anyone
who is convicted of a crime for which imprisonment is a possible
sentence, regardless of the sentence they actually receive, the na-
ture of their particular crime, or their criminal history.”156  The law
ensnares anyone who has been convicted of a felony.  With the lack
152. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this shameful history in 1985 when it
unanimously struck down an Alabama constitutional provision—enacted in
1901 by lawmakers who openly stated that their goal was to ‘establish white
supremacy’—that had permanently taken the vote from two men who had
each written a bad check, a crime of ‘moral turpitude’ according to the
state’s attorney general.
Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1997,
available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V8/35/shapiro-a.html.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
154. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 (1966) (poll tax); Lassiter v.
Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 46 (1959) (literacy test); Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 357 (1915) (grandfather clause and literacy test).
155. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
156. Metzger, supra note 104.
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of uniformity across jurisdictions, in addition to the Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to interfere with the criminal justice systems
of individual states, perhaps in deferential respect of federalism, it
is imperative that Congress acts on ex-felons’ behalf and enacts
legislation that will secure the automatic restoration of their rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The denial of any of the rights of citizenship associated with
Marshall’s elements157 denies full citizenship to convicted felons.
Of the convicted felon status group members, ex-felons possess the
strongest moral and legal claim for the automatic restoration of
their rights following release from the criminal justice system.  Ex-
felons have performed the affirmative duty of serving their re-
quired sentence following conviction.  While the State may have a
compelling reason to deny the franchise to convicted felons who
are either incarcerated, on probation, or on parole, there is no
compelling or legitimate state interest for withholding the vote
from ex-felons,158 other than punishment.  “Disenfranchising ex-
felons who have served their time and paid their debt to society is
indefensible under even the most punitive theories of criminal jus-
tice.”159  A released ex-felon is thrust into a halfway status of hav-
ing physical freedom, but not the full rights of a free citizen.
Ex-felons are required and expected to comply with the affirma-
tive duties of citizenship, such as obeying the law and paying taxes,
yet they do not receive the attendant benefits and rewards for the
performance of those duties.  In fact, the ex-felon situation paral-
lels that of the founding fathers who stated that taxation without
representation was unfair and commenced a revolution to end the
tyranny of a system of government that did not recognize them as
full citizens.160  In addition to the principled reasons for restoring
theses rights, there are important practical considerations as well.
With the silencing of ex-felons and the resulting ostracism that
occurs, ex-felons are more likely to re-offend.161  Felon exclusion
laws contribute to the difficulty of prisoners reentering their com-
157. MARSHALL, supra note 23, at 71-72.
158. There is no compelling reason to deny the franchise to any convicted felon.
This Article concedes that point merely to stress that ex-felons have completed their
sentences and the punishment should end at the conclusion of their legislatively man-
dated sentences.
159. Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, supra note 152.
160. The American Revolution commenced with the rallying cry of “no taxation
without representation.” NORTON ET AL., supra note 122, at 92.
161. See Rose & Clear, supra note 119, at 187-192.
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munities.  “There can be no legitimate Constitutional basis for dis-
enfranchising them once the state has freed them to reintegrate
into society.  Denying them the right to participate in the core of
democratic governance only raises barriers to their rehabilitation
as law-abiding members of the community.”162  Moreover, in-
creased alienation is a factor that leads to increased acts of crimi-
nality, and thus an increase in recidivism.163  Faced with a denial of
rights, convicted felons are likely to have a lack of respect for the
law; the commission of future crimes is not deemed a violation of
the social compact because the contract no longer exists.164  By
keeping ex-felons on the margins of society, many will become re-
peat offenders.
While some suggest that “it makes little difference whether ex-
cons regain the vote because they are unlikely to use it,”165 that is
not the point.  One of the most important federal protections is the
right of both state and national membership in the American pol-
ity.166  In other words, one of the most inviolable rights is that of
citizenship.  The Constitution mandates that no distinctions regard-
ing the citizens of each state shall exist.  Ex-felons, however, are
the exception to that rule.  In each jurisdiction, full citizenship for
the individual ex-felon and the collective citizenship of their com-
munities are undermined in some manner, effectively rendering the
ex-felon and the community powerless to participate in the gov-
erning of society.167  Felon exclusion laws infringe upon the  ex-
162. Metzger, supra note 104.
163. “Disenfranchising ex-convicts is counterproductive as a matter of criminal pol-
icy.  Criminologists have found that people who feel connected to their communities
are much less likely to commit crimes than those without community ties.”  David
Cole, Denying Felons Vote Hurts Them, Society, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2000, at 17A.
164. Alex Friedmann, a recently released ex-felon, stated, “[i]f society doesn’t care
enough about former prisoners to treat them as citizens, with voting rights of citizens,
then why should former prisoners care enough about society to act like law-abiding
citizens?”  Thompson, supra note 107, at 17.
165. Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, supra note 152.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
167. Disenfranchisement is the harshest civil sanction imposed by a demo-
cratic society . . . the disenfranchised is severed from the body politic and
condemned to the lowest form of citizenship . . . voiceless at the ballot
box . . . the disinherited must sit idly by while others elect his civic leaders
and while others choose the fiscal and governmental policies which will gov-
ern him and his family.
Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, supra note 152.  “The right to vote is a precious consti-
tutional right that, if denied, silences a group already on society’s margins.  Denying
prisoners and ex-convicts the vote serves no legitimate penal purpose, impedes reha-
bilitation and denies all of us the views of those who have experienced prison from
the inside.”  Cole, supra note 163, at 17A.
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felons’ full citizenship because they deny to ex-felons the same
rights and privileges granted to other citizens while simultaneously
undermining the community’s collective citizenship.  The only rem-
edy in accord with the interest of justice is the automatic restora-
tion of rights; second class citizenship is no citizenship at all.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ301.txt unknown Seq: 37 20-SEP-07 10:46
2007] UNDERMINING CITIZENSHIP 869
APPENDIX I – RIGHT TO VOTE LOST UPON CONVICTION
IF INCARCERATED
California CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4; Flood v. Riggs, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-103(4) (2006); Danielson v.
Dennis, 139 P.3d 688 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46(a)-(b) (2006).
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.02(7)(A) (LexisNexis
2007).
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-2(a)(1) (2006).
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-310(1) (2006).
Illinois ILL. CONST. art. II, § 2; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5-
5-5(c) (2006).
Indiana IND. CODE § 3-7-13-4(a) (2006).
Kentucky KY. CONST. § 145.
Louisiana LA. CONST. art. I, § 10; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:102 (2007); Crothers v. Jones, 120 So. 2d 248
(La. 1960).
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 30 (West 2006).
Michigan MICH. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 168.758b (2006).
Montana MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-
1-111(2) (2005); Melton v. Oleson, 530 P.2d 466
(Mont. 1974).
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2(I)(a), (b) (2006).
New York ASSEMB. B. 11652, 228th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005) (On
June 21, 2005, the New York State Assembly passed
the Voting Rights Notification and Registration Act,
a bill that would reduce barriers to voting for
individuals with felony convictions).
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-33-01 (2005).
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (West 2007); State
ex rel. Corrigan v. Barnes, 443 N.E.2d 1034 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1982).
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 137.281 (2006).
Pennsylvania 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2602(w) (2007); 25 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 3146.1 (2007); United States v. Essig, 10
F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 1993); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d
25 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 963 (1983);
1974 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 186 (No. 47) (1974).
South Dakota S.D. CONST. art. III, § 3 & art. VII, § 2; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-35 (2007) .
Utah UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20A-1-705 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101
(2006); Dodge v. Evans, 716 P.2d 270 (Utah 1985).
Here incarceration refers to actual confinement and
not a suspended prison term.
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APPENDIX II – RIGHT TO VOTE DENIED UPON CONVICTION
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030 (2006).
Arizona Conviction of a felony suspends the rights to vote,
to hold public office, and to serve on a jury. ARIZ.
CONST. art. VII, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
904(A)(1)-(3) (2007), 16-101(5), 21-201(3).
Arkansas ARK. CONST. art. 3, §§ 1, 2 amended by ARK.
CONST. amend. 8; amend. 51, § 17.
Georgia GA. CONST. art. II, § I; GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-
216(b) (2007);  1986 OP. ATTY. GEN. GA. 25 (No.
86-15) (1986).
Iowa IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5; IOWA CODE § 48A.30
(2006).
Kansas A person convicted in state or federal court of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for one year or
longer and sentenced to imprisonment forfeits the
rights to vote. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4615(1), (2)
(2005).
Maryland A person convicted of “theft or other infamous
crime” loses the right to vote. MD. CODE ANN.,
ELEC. LAW, § 3-4(c) (West2006).
Minnesota MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. VII,
§ 6; MINN. STAT. § 201.014, subdiv. 2(a) (2007);
MINN. STAT. § 609.165, subdiv. 1 (2007).
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. § 115.332(C) (2007); MO. REV.
STAT. §  561.026(1) (2007); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 561.026(2) (2007); Bruno v. Murdock, 406 S.W.2d
294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); State ex rel. Barrett v.
Sartorius, 351 Mo. 1237 (1943).
Nevada A person convicted of “treason or felony in any
state” may not vote in Nevada unless restored to
civil rights. NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:51-3(a) (West 2007); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1(8) (West 2007); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 19:4-1(6), (7) (West 2007).
New Mexico N.M. CONST. art. VII; §§ 1, 2; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-1-2, 31-13-1(A) (West 2007); State ex rel. Cha-
vez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445 (N.M. 1968).
North Carolina A person “adjudged guilty” of a state or federal fel-
ony or of a felony in another state that would be a
felony in North Carolina forfeits the right to vote.
N.C. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2(3), 8.
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101(1) (2007); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 26, § 4-120 (2007).
Rhode Island “No felon shall be permitted to vote until comple-
tion of such felon’s sentence, served or suspended,
and of parole or probation . . . .” R.I. CONST. art.
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II, § 1; Bailey v. Baronian, 394 A.2d 1338 (R.I.
1978); Violet v. Voccola, 497 A.2d 709 (R.I. 1985).
South Carolina The right to vote is lost upon conviction of a felony
or an election crime until completion of sentence,
including probation and parole. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 7-5-120(B)(3) (2006).
Tennessee A person convicted of ”an infamous crime“ or
”convicted in federal or another state court of a
crime or offense which would constitute an infa-
mous crime under the laws of this state, regardless
of the sentence imposed,“ may not register to vote
or vote. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5; TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-19-143, 40-20-112.2 (2007).
Texas TEXAS CONST. art. 6, § 1; Shepherd v. Trevino, 575
F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979); Hayes v. Williams, 341 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) .
Washington WASH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 3; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 29A.01.079 (2007); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 2006
WL 1889273 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006) (On July 7,
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Washington dismissed the decade-long case in
which minority plaintiffs argued that discrimination
in the state’s criminal justice system leads to high
rates of disenfranchisement for minorities and there-
fore, violates Section 2 of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act.).
West Virginia W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; W. VA. CODE § 3-1-3
(2007).
Wisconsin A person convicted of ”treason, felony or bribery“
loses the right to vote. WIS. STAT. § 6.03(1)(b)
(2007).
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APPENDIX III – DISQUALIFICATION BASED UPON TYPE OF
OFFENSE
Alabama Anyone who is not a qualified elector or who has
been convicted of “treason, embezzlement of public
funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery or any
other crime punishable by imprisonment in the state
or federal penitentiary” is ineligible to hold public
office. ALA. CODE § 36-2-1(a)(1), (3) (2006).  Per-
sons convicted of “embezzlement of the public
money, bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime”
are ineligible to serve in the legislature or to hold
“any office of trust or profit.” ALA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 60; see Hogan v. Hartwell, 7 So. 2d 889, 894 (Ala.
1942) (disqualification from office applies to federal
as well as state convictions).
Arkansas A person convicted of embezzlement of public
money, bribery, forgery, or other “infamous” crime,
may not hold any office of trust or profit. ARK.
CONST. art. V, § 9.
California Any person convicted of vote-buying, bribery, per-
jury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high
crime is disqualified from public office. CAL.
CONST. art. VII, § 8; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1021
(2007); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 67, 68, 74, 88,
98.1(2007).
Delaware Individuals convicted of embezzlement of public
money, bribery, perjury, or other “infamous” crimes
are not eligible to hold a seat in the legislature or
any office of trust, honor, or profit.  DEL. CONST.
art. II, § 21.
District of Columbia A felon is disqualified from seeking or holding pub-
lic office, including the offices of Mayor and City
Council member, but only during a period of incar-
ceration.  D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-225, 1-241(c) (Lex-
isNexis 2007).
Florida FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 97.041(2)(b) (2007).
Indiana Persons convicted of a felony under Indiana law or
the law of another jurisdiction are disqualified from
holding or being a candidate for elected office. IND.
CODE § 3-8-1-5(b)(3) (2006).  This provision has
been held to apply to federal offenses. Wilson v.
Montgomery County Election Bd., 642 N.E.2d 258,
261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).  In addition, persons con-
victed of certain federal offenses lose the right to
hold public office. IND. CODE § 5-8-3-1 (2006).
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Kentucky A person convicted of a felony loses the right to
hold public office.  KY. CONST. § 150; KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29A.080(2)(e) (West 2007).  The dis-
qualification from office has been held to apply to
federal felons.  Arnett v. Stumbo, 153 S.W.2d 889,
891-92 (Ky. 1941).
Mississippi A person convicted after November 3, 1992, of any
offense that is a felony under Mississippi law or of a
federal felony is disqualified to hold any state office
of profit or trust. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 44(2).
This disqualification does not apply to persons con-
victed of manslaughter or of state or federal tax
offenses, unless the tax offense involved misuse or
abuse of office or of money that came to the defen-
dant through her office. MISS. CONST. art. IV,
§ 44(3).  In addition, any person convicted of brib-
ery to procure an election or appointment to office
is disqualified from holding office. MISS. CONST.
art. IV, § 44(1).
New York A convicted felon is not generally disqualified from
holding future office. 1983 N.Y. OP. ATT’Y GEN
(INF.) 1136 (1983).
Pennsylvania No person convicted of “embezzlement of public
moneys, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime,
shall be eligible to the General Assembly, or capa-
ble of holding any office of trust or profit in this
Commonwealth.” PA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
Tennessee A person convicted of “a felony or an infamous
crime and sentenced to the penitentiary, either on
the state or federal level” loses the right to seek or
hold public office. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-114
(2006).  Persons convicted of bribery, larceny, or
any infamous offense are disqualified from holding
office until their rights are restored. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 8-18-101(1) (2006).
Texas Any person who has been convicted of paying or
offering a bribe to procure her election or appoint-
ment to office is disqualified from holding any
office of profit or trust. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
Individuals convicted of certain other crimes may be
required to forfeit public office or may be ineligible
for public office. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 87.031 (Vernon 2006) (removal of county officer);
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §252.063 (Vernon
2006) (removal and ineligibility of municipal officers
and employees); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 406.018
(Vernon 2006) (removal of notary public upon con-
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viction of willful neglect of duty or official miscon-
duct).
West Virginia No person “convicted of treason, felony, or bribery
in an election, before any court in or out of this
state,” shall hold elected or appointed office “while
such conviction remains unreversed.” W. VA. CODE
§ 6-5-5 (2007).
Wisconsin A person convicted of an “infamous” crime in any
“court within the United States” is ineligible for any
office of trust, profit, or honor. WIS. CONST. art.
XIII, § 3.
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APPENDIX IV – RESTORATION GENERALLY NEEDED
Georgia A person who is not a registered voter or who has
been convicted of a “felony involving moral turpi-
tude” may not hold any office or appointment of
trust, unless her civil rights have been restored and
ten years have passed since completion of sentence
without subsequent conviction of another felony
involving moral turpitude. GA. CONST. art. II, § II,
para. III.  A person convicted of a felony involving
moral turpitude under the laws of Georgia, or of
any other jurisdiction if the offense would be a fel-
ony under Georgia law, loses the right to hold any
civil office, “unless restored to all his rights of citi-
zenship by a pardon from the State Board of Par-
dons and Paroles.” GA. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1(3)
(2006).  Persons convicted under federal law or the
law of any state of “fraudulent violation of primary
or election laws, malfeasance in office, or felony
involving moral turpitude” may not run for or be
elected to municipal, county, or state office or serve
in various election-related positions unless their civil
rights have been restored. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-8
(2006).
Nevada Since no person is eligible for public office unless
she is a qualified elector, NEV. CONST. art. 15, § 3, a
person who is disqualified from voting because of a
conviction is also ineligible for office.
Rhode Island A person is disqualified from seeking or holding
elective or appointive state or local office if she is
not a qualified elector, R.I. CONST. art. III, § 1, or if
she has been convicted of or pleaded nolo con-
tendere to a felony or to a misdemeanor resulting in
a jail sentence of six months or more, either sus-
pended or to be served. R.I. CONST. art. III, § 2.  A
person may not become eligible to hold public
office until three years have passed following com-
pletion of sentence, including probation or parole.
R.I. CONST. art. III, § 2.
South Carolina [E]ligibility for public office is contingent upon
being a qualified voter, S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 1,
and a person who is disqualified from voting by rea-
son of a conviction is also disqualified from public
office.  A person convicted of felony embezzlement
of public funds is also disqualified from holding any
office of honor or emolument in the state; this disa-
bility may be removed by a two-thirds vote of the
General Assembly upon payment in full of the prin-
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cipal and interest of the sum embezzled. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-13-210 (2006).
Virginia Because the right to hold office is contingent upon
being qualified to vote, a person convicted of a fel-
ony also loses the right to hold public office. VA.
CONST. art. II, § 5.
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APPENDIX V – FORFEITURE OF OFFICE
Iowa It is grounds for contesting an election that the
incumbent had been “duly convicted of a felony.”
IOWA CODE § 57.1(2)(c) (1970).  Conviction of a fel-
ony is also grounds for removal of an appointed
state officer. IOWA CODE § 66.26(8) (1999).  The
disqualification from holding office has been held to
apply to federal felons.  State ex rel. Dean v.
Haubrich, 83 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Iowa 1957).
New Jersey A person holding public office or employment at
the time of conviction of an offense involving dis-
honesty or a third or higher degree crime under
New Jersey law (or its equivalent under federal law
or the law of another state) forfeits his position.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:51-2(a) (West 2005).  A per-
son holding public office or employment forfeits his
office or position if convicted of an “offense involv-
ing or touching on his public office, position or
employment,” and is “forever disqualified from
holding any office or position of honor, trust or
profit under this State or any of its administrative
or political subdivisions.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:51-
2(d) (2005).  The state appellate court has deter-
mined that this disqualification applies to all govern-
ment employment.  Pastore v. County of Essex, 237
N.J. Super. 371, 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989), cert. denied, 122 N.J. 129 (1990).
New Mexico A person convicted of a felony or infamous crime
forfeits the right to hold public office; N.M. CONST.
art. VII, §§ 1, 2; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1-2, 31-13-
1(A) (2006); state ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d
445, 450 (N.M. 1968) (disqualification from holding
office held to arise from federal offenses as well as
state crimes).
Ohio A state or federal felon loses the rights to hold an
office of honor, trust, or profit. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2961.01 (West 2006).
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APPENDIX VI – PERMANENTLY BARRED FROM JURY SERVICE
Alabama ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a)(4) (1978).
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102(a)(4) (1969).
California CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203(a)(5) (West 1988).
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4509(b)(6) (1975).
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.013(1) (West 1877).
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-60(b)(2) (1877); GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-12-120 (1869); Clark v. State, 338 S.E.2d
269, 271 (Ga. 1986) (The disqualification from grand
jury service has been interpreted to apply only to
persons convicted after 1976 and only to those con-
victed of felonies under Georgia law, not under fed-
eral law or the law of another state.); 33 OP. ATT’Y
GEN. GA. 69 (1983).
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-4(b2) (1973).
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-310(1) (1972) (losing civil
rights).
Kentucky KY. CONST. § 150; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 29A.080(2)(e) (West 2006).
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 9-202 (West 2006),
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-207(b)(5)-
(6) (West 2006).
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234A, § 4(7) (Mass.
1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 8 (West
1982).
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. § 561.026(3) (1977).
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-303 (1895).
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-112 (1873).
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 6.010 (2003).
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1(e) (West 1995).
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-1 (West 1978).
New York N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3) (McKinney 1977).
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (West 1953).
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 28(B)(6) (1949).
Pennsylvania 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4502(3) (West 2006).
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-9-1.1. 56 (1956).
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-810(1) (1984).
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-35 (1939).
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-102 (1987).
Texas TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.102(7) (Vernon 1985);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 19.08(4) (Vernon
2005).
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-7(2) (2002).
Virginia VA. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
338 (1977).
West Virginia W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b)(5), (6) (1986).
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-102 (2003); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-10-106(a) (1982).
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APPENDIX VII – RESTRICTION OR DENIAL OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT AND LICENSING, NOT
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
Arizona A person may be denied public employment or a
license “if the offense has a reasonable relationship
to the functions of the employment or occupation
for which the license, permit or certificate is
sought.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904(E)
(2007).  Examples include: certified public account-
ant, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-721(A)(3), 32-
741(A)(1) (2007); dentist and dental hygienist,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1263(2), 32-1290
(2007); nurse, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-
1663(A)(2), (D)(2) (2007); and pharmacist, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1927(A)(1) (2007).
California A conviction of a crime may result in the denial,
suspension, or revocation of a professional or busi-
ness license if the crime is substantially related to
the qualifications, functions, or duties of the busi-
ness or profession. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 490
(West 2007). Some of these licenses include: law,
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6060(b) (2007); real
estate, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10177(b) (West
2007); medicine, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2236
(West 2007); nursing, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 2761(f) (2007); physical therapy, CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 2660(d) (West 2007).  Conviction of
certain drug or sex offenses results in suspension
and revocation of credentials issued by the State
Board of Education or the Commission on Teacher
Credentialing, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44425 (West
2007), or in the loss of other jobs in the field of
education, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44435 (West 2007).
Colorado A felony conviction involving moral turpitude does
not automatically disqualify an individual from pub-
lic employment or a professional or occupational
license, but it may be taken into account in deter-
mining whether an applicant has the good moral
character to qualify for such employment or license,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-5-101 (2006), and in deny-
ing, revoking, or suspending a license. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-35-129(b) (2006) (dentist); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-25-108(c) (2006) (engineer); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-38-117(b) (2006) (nurse); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-22-125(1)(b) (2006) (pharmacist); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-36-117(f) (2006) (physician); and
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-113(m) (2006) (realtor);
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COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-304(4)(a) (2006) (peace
officer).
Connecticut A person may not be denied state employment or
an occupational or professional license solely
because of conviction of a crime. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46a-80(a) (2006).  Such employment or
license may be denied because of a conviction if it
is determined that the person is not suitable for the
job, taking into account the nature of the offense
and its relationship to the job, the rehabilitation of
the person, and the age of the conviction. CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-80(b), 46a-81(a) (2006).  Exam-
ples include, day care center operator or worker,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-87a(a) (2006); psychologist,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-192 (2006); and public
accountant, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-281a(8) (2006).
Florida A person may not be disqualified from public
employment solely because of a criminal conviction
unless the conviction was for a felony or a first-
degree misdemeanor and directly related to the
position of employment sought. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 112.011(1)(a) (West 2007).  These restrictions do
not apply to law enforcement or correctional agen-
cies, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.011(2)(a) (2007), or to
the fire department, as to which a four-year disqual-
ification is imposed (unless the person receives a
pardon or has his civil rights restored), FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 112.011(2)(b) (2007).
Kentucky A person may be denied public employment or an
occupational or professional license on account of a
felony conviction. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 335B.010, 335B.020 (West 2007).  Examples
include: insurance, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.9-
440(1)(f) (West 2007); dentistry, KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 313.130(1) (West 2007); nursing, KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 314.091(1)(b) (West 2007); and
medicine, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.595(4) (West
2007).
Louisiana A person may not be denied certain professional or
occupational licenses solely because of his criminal
record unless he was convicted of a felony and the
crime directly relates to the position or occupation.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2950(a) (2006).  The
restriction does not apply to many licensing boards
such as civil engineering, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:698(a)(3)-(5) (2006); dentistry, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN.  § 37:776(a)(2) (2006); medicine, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(a)(1), (2) (2006); or psychol-
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ogy, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2359(b)(4), (5)
(2006).
Minnesota A person may not be disqualified from public
employment or from obtaining an occupational or
professional license solely or in part because of a
conviction unless the crime directly relates to the
position. MINN. STAT. § 364.03, subdiv. 1 (2006).
Professions or occupations in which a conviction
may be taken into account in the licensing decision
include: insurance, MINN. STAT. § 72B.08, subdiv.
1(f) (2006); medicine, MINN. STAT. § 147.091, sub-
div. 1(c) (2006); nursing, MINN. STAT. § 148.261,
subdiv. 1(3) (2006); dentistry, MINN. STAT.
§ 150A.08, subdiv. 1(2), (3) (2006); pharmacy, MINN.
STAT. § 151.06, subdiv. 1(7)(ii), (iii) (2006); veteri-
nary medicine, MINN. STAT. § 156.081, subdiv. 2(2)
(2006); and law, MINN. STAT. § 481.15, subdiv. 1(1)
(2006).
Missouri A state agency may consider a felony conviction as
a factor.  MO. REV. STAT. § 314.200 (2006).  For
example, the State Board of Education may refuse
to issue (or may revoke) a teacher’s certificate upon
conviction of a felony. MO. REV. STAT. § 168.071(2)
(2006).  A person with a felony conviction may not
serve as a superintendent or member of the patrol
or radio personnel of the state highway patrol. MO.
REV. STAT. § 43.060 (2006).
New Jersey A state licensing authority may not disqualify an
applicant solely because he has been convicted of a
crime, unless the crime relates adversely to the pro-
fession or occupation for which licensure is sought.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:168A-2 (West 2007).
New Mexico A felony conviction or a misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude may be considered by a state
agency or licensing authority for a professional or
occupational license. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1, 28-
2, 28-2-3, 28-2-4; see Garcia v. State Bd. of Educ.,
694 P.2d 1371, 1375 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984), cert.
denied, 694 P.2d 1358 (N.M. 1985).
Washington Neither public employment nor a professional or
occupational license may be denied solely because
of a felony conviction unless the offense is directly
related to the position sought and less than ten
years have elapsed since conviction, although the
fact of a prior conviction of a crime may be consid-
ered. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96A.020(1), (2) (2006).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ301.txt unknown Seq: 50 20-SEP-07 10:46
882 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
APPENDIX VIII – OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE REGULATIONS
BUT NOT EMPLOYMENT
Arkansas A professional or occupational license may be
revoked, suspended, or denied as a consequence of
a felony conviction. ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-
409(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (physician); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 17-82-316(b)(C)(3) (2006) (dentist); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 17-97-310(a)(2) (2006) (psychiatrist);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-96-308(a)(2) (2006) (podia-
trist); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-12-601(a)(5) (public
accountant), ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-36-306(5) (2006)
(landscape architect).
Delaware A professional or occupational license may be
revoked or suspended for conviction of certain
crimes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1731(b)(2)
(2007) (medicine); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1131(2) (2007) (dentistry); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
24, § 117(4), (5) (2007) (accountant); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 2912(c) (2007) (real estate).
Indiana The offense may be taken into account in determin-
ing “whether the applicant or holder should be
entrusted to serve the public in a particular capac-
ity.” IND. CODE § 25-1-1.1-1 (2006).  In addition, an
occupational or professional license may be revoked
or suspended for conviction of certain drug offenses
(generally involving possession of drugs or drug par-
aphernalia), IND. CODE § 25-1-1.1-2 (2006), and
must be revoked or suspended for conviction of
other drug offenses (generally involving trafficking
or manufacture of certain drugs). IND. CODE § 25-
1-1.1-3 (2006).  Rule 12 of the Indiana Rules for
Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of Attor-
neys precludes convicted felons from taking the bar
examination. IND. CT. R. ADMISSION TO THE BAR
& DISCIPLINE OF ATTY’S 12.
Maine A licensing agency may take into account criminal
history to determine whether to grant a license, but
a felony conviction is not an automatic bar to licen-
sure. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 5301(1) (2006).
In addition, there are time limits (three years for
some professions and 10 years for others) upon con-
sidering the conviction itself, rather than the con-
duct, in the licensing decision. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 5303 (2006).
Michigan A “judgment of guilt in a criminal prosecution . . .
shall not be used, in and of itself, by a licensing
board or agency as proof of a person’s lack of good
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moral character,” but it “may be used as evidence
in the determination.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.42
(2006).  Some licenses for which conviction of cer-
tain crimes may result in denial, suspension, or rev-
ocation include: private detective, MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 338.830(1)(c), 338.838(1) (2006); private
security guard, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 338.1056(1)(e), 338.1060(1)(c) (2006); and real
estate broker, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 339.2505(2)
(2006).
Montana A professional or occupational license may not be
refused solely because of a previous conviction.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-1-203 (2005).  A license
may be denied if the applicant has been convicted
of a criminal offense that “relates to the public
health, welfare, and safety as it applies to the occu-
pation for which the license is sought” and the
licensing agency finds that the “applicant so con-
victed has not been sufficiently rehabilitated as to
warrant the public trust.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-
1-203 (2005).
North Dakota A person may be denied a license if it is determined
that he has not been sufficiently rehabilitated, or
that the offense has a direct bearing upon his ability
to serve the public in that job. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-33-02.1 (2005).
Oregon A licensing board or agency may “consider the rela-
tionship of the facts which support the conviction
and all intervening circumstances to the specific
occupational or professional standards in determin-
ing the fitness of the person to receive or hold the
license.” OR. REV. STAT. § 670.280 (2005).  This
statute does not apply to all licensing decisions. See,
e.g., In re Gortmaker, 782 P.2d 421, 428 (Or. 1989)
(Or. Rev. Stat. § 670.280 does not apply in proceed-
ing to reinstate an attorney suspended upon convic-
tion of a felony and may not preclude adverse
licensing decisions based upon specific, designated
criminal convictions.).  Occupations in which convic-
tion of certain crimes may be relevant to a licensing
decision include: accountant, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 673.170(2)(h) (2005); tax consultant, OR. REV.
STAT. §  673.700(4)(a), (b) (2005); social worker,
OR. REV. STAT. § 675.540(1)(a), (b) (2005); and
physician, OR. REV. STAT. §  677.190(6) (2005).
South Carolina Persons convicted of certain crimes may be disquali-
fied from obtaining or maintaining a professional or
occupational license. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-53-
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150(a)(6) (2006) (bail bondsman); § 40-37-220(2)
(2006) (optometrist); § 40-47-200(F)(2) (2006) (phy-
sician); and § 40-63-110(2) (2006) (social worker);
§ 23-6-40(B)(4) (2006) (law enforcement officer).
Texas Persons convicted of a felony or misdemeanor that
“directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of
the licensed occupation” are subject to license revo-
cation, suspension, or denial. TEX. OCC. CODE.
ANN. § 53.021 (Vernon 2006).  A convicted federal
or state felon may not serve as the executor or
administrator of an estate, unless he is pardoned or
has had his civil rights restored. TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 78(b) (Vernon 2006).
Virginia A licensing board may deny a license if it finds, in
light of all information available, that the applicant
is unfit or unsuited to engage in that occupation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-204 (2006).  Examples
include optometry, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3215(2)
(2006); nursing, VA. CODE ANN.  § 54.1-3007(4)
(2006); dentistry, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2706(2)
(2006); accounting, VA. CODE ANN.  § 54.1-2006(2)
(2006); funeral director, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2806(1) (2006); and pharmacy, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-3316(9) (2006).
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APPENDIX IX – SPECIFIC OCCUPATION LICENSING STATUTES
Alabama ALA. CODE § 34-3-86(1) (2007) (attorney); ALA.
CODE § 34-1-12(5), (6) (2007) (certified public
accountant); ALA. CODE  § 34-24-360(4) (2007)
(physician); ALA. CODE  § 34-9-18(A)(5), (11)
(2007) (dentist).
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 21.27.410(A)(7) (2006) (insurance
agent); ALASKA STAT. § 08.04.450(5), (6) (2006)
(accountant); ALASKA STAT. § 08.68.270(2) (2006)
(nurse); ALASKA STAT. § 08.88.171(A) (2006) (real
estate broker).
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-3305.3(A)(1) (LexisNexis
2007) (health care professional); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-2729(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2007) (veterinarian);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2503 (LexisNexis 2007)
(attorney); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-115(G)(1) (Lexis-
Nexis 2007) (liquor license).
Georgia State examining boards may deny or revoke an
occupational or professional license, or impose disci-
pline upon a licensee, because of a conviction of
any felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude
in any state or federal court. GA. CODE ANN.  § 43-
1-19(a)(3) (2007).  Examples include: chiropractor,
GA. CODE ANN. § 43-9-12(a)(3) (2007); dentist, GA.
CODE ANN. § 43-11-47(a)(3) (2007); and dietician,
GA. CODE ANN. § 43-11a-15(3) (2007).
Idaho A state agency may demote, suspend, or discharge
an employee who is convicted of official misconduct
in office, any felony, or any other crime involving
moral turpitude. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5309(n)(9)
(2006).  State licensing boards may revoke, suspend,
or refuse to issue a license because of a felony con-
viction. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 3-301(1) (2006)  (law);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1208(1)(f)-(k) (2006)
(teaching); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2113 (2006)
(veterinary medicine); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-
1726(c)(1) (2006) (pharmacy); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 54-923 (2006) (dentistry); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-
608(3) (2006) (podiatry); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-
305(1)(d) (2006) (architecture); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 54-219 (1)(e) (2006) (accounting).
Iowa A felony conviction “related to the profession or
occupation of the licensee” or “that would affect
the licensee’s ability to practice within a profession”
is grounds for suspending or revoking a professional
license in a number of health-related occupations,
including medicine, podiatry, osteopathy, psychol-
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ogy, chiropractor, physical therapy, nursing, den-
tistry, dental hygiene, optometry, speech pathology,
audiology, occupational therapy, pharmacy, cosme-
tology, barbering, dietetics, mortuary science, and
social work.  IOWA CODE §§ 147.2, 147.55(5) (2006).
Other fields in which a felony conviction may be
relevant to the licensing decision include: account-
ant, IOWA CODE § 542c.21(5) (2006); real estate
broker, IOWA CODE § 543b.29(5) (2006), and land-
scape architect, IOWA CODE § 544b.15(5) (2006).
Maryland The restricted occupations are: veterinary medicine,
MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2-310(2)-  (4) (2006);
accounting, MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF.
§ 2-315(a)(3) (2006); dentistry, MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH OCC. § 4-315(a)(4) (2006); nursing, MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 8-316(a)(4) (2006);
and optometry, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC.
§ 11-313(3) (2006).
Mississippi The following licenses are restricted: alcohol license,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-1-57(a) (2006); apothecary,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-303 (2006); architect,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-1-29(1)(g) (2006); attorney,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-3-41 (2006); bail agent, MISS.
CODE ANN. § 83-39-3(2) (2006); retailer of beer and
light wine, MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-3-19 (2006); bingo
gaming supplies or equipment, MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-33-201(2)(a), (b) (2006); bingo game operator,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-33-57(4)(a), (b) (2006); chi-
ropractor, MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-6-19(1)(e) (2006);
dentist, MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-35 (2006); state
gaming license, MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-67(3)
(2006); insurance agent, MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-17-
123(1)(f) (2006); nurse, MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-15-
29(1)(b) (2006); optometrist, MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-
19-23(2)(c), (d) (2006); physician, MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 73-25-29(1)(d), (f); 99-19-35 (2006); psychologist,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-31-21(1)(b) (2006); speech
pathologist or audiologist, MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-
38-27(1)(c) (2006); social worker, MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 73-53-13(d)(iv) (2006); school teacher or adminis-
trator, MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-3-2(7)(g)-(h), (8)(d)-
(e) (2006); and veterinarian, MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-
39-19(c) (2006). A felon may not serve as a sheriff’s
deputy, MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-25-19 (2006), nor as
the administrator of an estate, MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 91-7-65 (2006).
Nebraska A felony conviction is grounds for denial, suspen-
sion, or revocation of a professional or occupational
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license. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1 147.10(1)(a),(e)
(2006) (pharmacy); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.24(28)
(2006) (real estate); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-503
(2006) (employment agency).
Nevada A professional or occupational license may be
denied, suspended, or revoked because of a convic-
tion for a gaming employee, NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 463.335(8)(c), (d) (2006); nurse, NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 632.320(2) (2006); employment agent, NEV. REV.
STAT. § 611.045(1)(a) (2006); contractor, NEV. REV.
STAT. § 624.265(3) (2006); or physician, NEV. REV.
STAT. § 630.301(1) (2006).
North Carolina A professional or occupational license may be
denied, suspended, or revoked because of certain
convictions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 83A-15(a) (2006)
(architect); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28(b)(1) (2006)
(attorney); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(7), (c)
(2006) (physician); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-171.37(2)
(1981) (nurse); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93-12(9)(a)
(2006) (public accountant); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-
6(b)(2) (2006) (real estate broker); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-900(a)(3) (2006) (alcohol permit).
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-13-312(B)(12) (2006) (real
estate broker); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-201(1)
(2006) (attorney); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-26-
217(A)(4) (2006) (private investigator).
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4804(A)(7) (2005) (insur-
ance agent or broker); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1582(A)(2) (2005) (nurse); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,
§ 661(1) (2005) (license to sell lottery tickets).
West Virginia A felony conviction may be grounds for suspension
or annulment of a professional license. W. VA.
CODE § 30-2-6 (2007) (attorney), W. VA. CODE
§ 30-7-11(b) (2007) (registered professional nurse),
W. VA. CODE § 30-10-11(e) (2007) (veterinarian).
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